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This research discusses the characteristics that make projects difficult to manage. Project 
inefficiencies and failures can be attributed to the structure of a system. Developing a 
measurement for complexity based on the number and nature of interactions in the system can 
allow project complexity to be reduced while still meeting project objectives. Previous research 
has identified characteristics or markers of complex systems but does not address how to 
measure or how to reduce a system’s complexity.  
The objective of this dissertation is to develop a metric for complexity that assists project and 
emergency managers in reducing project complexity either by engineering complexity out, if 
possible, in the planning stage, or by managing the system during an ad hoc incident. The 
proposed measure uses the number of interactions for a given perspective of the system as the 
metric of complexity and uses disequilibrium from the expected normal state as an indicator of 
an irreducible interaction and an indicator of complexity. The proposed hypothesis is discussed 
through mathematical and visual examples to illustrate disequilibrium in system interactions.  
The methodology is demonstrated in three case studies: one in construction, through the Morgan 
Street Bridge project over the Rock River in Rockford, Illinois; and two in emergency response 
incidents (one local and one State/Federal). These cases demonstrate how this measure of 
complexity can be used to reduce complexity in a project by identifying the perspective of interest 
in the system, determining the disequilibrium in the interactions, and reducing the interactions 





1.1 Problem Statement 
Project management, which includes emergency response, is fundamentally the management of 
a system of resources to accomplish project objectives (ICCPM 2012). Failures of project 
management reduce efficiency, increase cost, and can prevent the project objectives from being 
met (Jordan et al. 2016). Nationally, regionally, and locally, there is interest from emergency 
managers, responders, and elected officials to understand why communications continue to be a 
problem, especially given the large sums of money routinely allocated to improving 
communications and information flow (Comfort et al. 2004; Manoj et al. 2007). Therefore, the 
emphasis of this research is to explore the issues of information flow failures in project 
management - emergency response in particular. The question this research attempts to answer 
is: What specific characteristics make projects difficult to manage?  
Project management has traditionally used methods that assume projects to be static, with fixed 
material quantities, and predictable timetables (ICCPM 2012). Variations to these assumptions 
are accounted for by incorporating contingency factors based on statistical characterization of 
specific variables related to cost and schedule. However, if the conditions of the project vary 
beyond this contingency envelop, projects begin to run “over budget” and “behind schedule” 
despite the best efforts of traditional project management. More recently, the complexity of 
projects has been recognized as the causal factor behind project management failures  (ICCPM 
2012), (Vidal et al. 2011). Vidal et al. (2011) states that “ever growing project complexity is an 
ever-growing source of project risks”. The International Centre for Complex Project Management 
Standards (2012) classify projects as complex if the project is: emergent, adaptive with sensitivity 
to initial conditions, and contains feedback loops (ICCPM 2012); characteristics that are also 
supported by Remington and Pollack (2007) in their study of system complexity. It has been 
suggested that a pathway to improving efficiency, and reducing delays in project management, is 
to assess and address the challenges presented by complexity of projects (Owens et al. 2012; 
(ICCPM 2012). 
Emergency management is a subset of project management. In the United States, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) recognized the impact of poor project (or incident) 
management in the 1970’s and began to put in place an organizational structure (called the 
Incident Command System (ICS) when it was finally implemented by the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 (Nicholson et al. 2006)) to standardize emergency response in the United States (Bigley 
and Roberts 2001). One of the initial concerns was the ability for a standardized organizational 
structure to scale possessing the ability to work for incidents as small as a single car traffic stop 
all the way up to a hurricane response (Favero 1999). However, there continue to be failures even 
with this standardized Incident Command System in place. After Action Reports (AAR), emergency 
management practitioners, and the literature (Grinter et al. 1999) frequently identify information 
flow failures as a source of incident response inefficiency (Comfort et al. 2009; Federal Emergency 
Management Agency 2018a; Richardson and Byers 2006).  
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Few failure modes of emergency response information flow have been identified (Manoj et al. 
2007) and modern crisis are becoming more complex (Weick et al. 2008). However, literature 
reveals some clues as to where information flow failures have occurred. The work by Comfort et 
al. (2004) identified how the amount and type of information provided to responders impacts the 
emergency response efficiency. Comfort et al. (2004) also examines the structure of the response. 
Specifically, local jurisdictions respond more efficiently on their own, rather than in a centralized 
(state-wide for example) controlled system. However, the study did not examine the integrated 
response framework of ICS and the information flow through its structure, but rather a non-ICS 
structure. Another study by Jensen and Jr., Waugh (2014) suggests the ICS framework is not useful 
as an all-hazards framework but only in ‘routine’ or ‘practiced’ emergencies where responders 
already understood the structure of the response, suggesting that the structure of the response 
impacts the information flow. This result also indicates that when an incident is not a normal 
incident or does not progress as expected, there are information flow issues. Moynihan (2009) 
identifies a number of issues with the ICS framework’s structure that are actually information flow 
issues. But the previous works do not identify the intersections between the information flow 
failure types with incident hazard type and size. Nor do these works directly address the issue of 
emergency response complexity, but they do discuss issues that are characteristics of complex 
systems. The conjecture is that the causes of information flow failure identified in the literature 
are actually indications of complex systems.     
1.2 Objective 
The objective of this research is to determine a measure of complexity and system characteristics 
that identify information flow failure in project management. This will determine the impact of 
system complexity on information flow. The result of this research will be a metric to assess 
complexity of systems and the likely points of failure. Emergency managers, responders, and 
project managers can apply this metric to engineer out or reduce the frequency and mitigate the 
impacts of information flow failures.  
Previous works have examined various parts of complex systems and the emergency response 
process. Emergency response and recovery is a process involving many agencies, resources, and 
levels of government that must communicate to be successful and efficient (Jordan and Javernick-
Will 2013). Hence, the questions motivating this research are: 
• System Complexity: What are complex system characteristics? How is complexity 
defined? How is complexity measured? 
• ICS Structure: What is the structure? Are there known problems with the structure? How 
does ICS scale? 
• Information flow: What information flow problems does ICS have? Does information flow 
scale as ICS scales? How does scaling change the information flow? 
This dissertation specifically examines the case of information flow failures between components 
of a system through the lens of complexity. 
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1.3 Contributions and Expected Outcomes 
The contributions of this dissertation are the methods to identify the ways complexity is impacting 
projects in an objective way, in contrast to existing methods that are superficial and based on 
categorization. The development of a metric for complexity will contribute to identifying 
information flow failure points in project management and emergency response. Managers and 
coordinators can use this information to design their plans to limit the factors that negatively 
impact the information flow.  
The expected outcomes of this research are:  
• A method of measuring complexity  
• Methods to identify disequilibrium in systems 
These outcomes will allow managers to reduce the information flow failure potential of their 
projects. 
1.4 Organization 
The problem driving this dissertation is project management failure - why are failures occurring? 
The hypothesis is that project management failures are occurring due to the structure of the 
project system, specifically number and nature of the interactions between the components of 
the system. In order to test this hypothesis, a metric is needed to measure the complexity of a 
system.  
This dissertation is organized into the following chapters: 
Chapter 1 discusses the motivation in determining a metric for complex systems, states 
the objectives, and outlines the expected outcomes.  
Chapter 2 discusses the background in complexity and reviews the literature of complex 
systems, disequilibrium, and discusses previous work to measure complexity. The points 
of departure from the literature are discussed leading to the proposed measure of 
complexity. 
Chapter 3 investigates the number and nature of complex systems through a discussion 
of visualization and analysis methods. These methods include graphical representation of 
systems (project), mathematical representations, and then examines these 
representations using signal processing techniques to try and reveal the underlying 
structure of the system.  
Chapter 4 applies the methods from chapter 3 in case studies. Three case studies are used 
(one in construction, two in emergency management) to show how the measure of 
complexity and the visualizations developed in Chapter 3 can be used to measure 
complexity, determine the disequilibrium in an interaction, and how complexity of the 
system can be reduced.  
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Chapter 5 discusses the conclusions of this dissertation, discuss the limitations,  and 
makes recommendations for future research. 





This dissertation will address systems, project management, complexity, and information flow. 
While the definitions of these terms vary throughout the literature, this dissertation will use the 
following definitions for consistency: 
Systems are defined as individual components connected together to function as a single unit.  
These connections are the internal interactions of the system. Systems can be permanently 
connected together or can be formed ad hoc. The whole system can be altered by changing out 
one component  (ICCPM 2012). 
Project management is defined as the organization and coordination of resources to accomplish 
a set of agreed upon objectives (either contractual or goal driven). Emergency response is a subset 
of project management because it also requires coordination and assignment of resources to form 
a system to accomplish objectives  (ICCPM 2012).  
Information is defined as a combination of data and content (Monge et al. 2003).   
Information flow is defined as the movement of a specific volume, content, or frequency of 
information between components of the system within a given time period (Matisziw et al. 2008). 
However, unlike a tangible object, the movement of information does not remove it from a 
previous location (Leonidas 2011).  
Information flow failures occur when the information is not completing the path between two 
components of the system. The failures are occurring at the information exchange points where 
two parts of a system are connected - i.e. the interactions in the structure of the system. Zachary 
(1977) also describes an information flow failure as a “bottleneck” or structural limitation. 
A channel is the path information flow takes. This could be in the form of voice traffic or electronic 
information (such as an email) (Zachary 1977). 
It is also important to note the differences between project operation, organization, and 
management.  
Project operation refers to the cyclic tasks to accomplish project objectives or sub-objectives. 
Project organization refers to the system that defines the relationships between the components. 
Project management is defined by (Munns and Bjeirmi 1996) as directing tasks and resources to 
accomplish the project objectives.  
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2.2 Defining Complexity 
Monge et al. (2003) discuss complexity in communication networks through a review of 
complexity and modeling research.  Monge et al. (2003) describe the components of complex 
systems as a network of agents, agent attributes and traits, rules for agent interactions, and the 
structure that results from the agent rules and interactions. Describing complex systems as a 
network of entities, Brook (2016) and Monge et al. (2003) also includes the topological 
relationships between agents in the network  impacting how agents transfer information between 
each other. Holden et al. (2013) agree with the importance of complex network topology but look 
at it from a resilience to disruption perspective. However, the number of relationships 
(connections) is not discussed further in these works. In similar work, Provan and Kenis (2008) 
discuss governance (control and organizational) for complex networks but do not clearly define 
what “complex” means. In addition to traits like experience and expertise (among others), three 
categories of traits by Axelrod et al. (1999), location, capabilities, and memory, are discussed. Key 
among these is memory, which includes past experiences, known contacts, and where agents can 
get information. Manson (2001) notes that the linking between components in a complex system 
allows them to accommodate a wide range of situations, in part, due to this memory 
characteristic, and Phelan (1999) states that agents learn from their own localized experiences. 
From a project management and emergency response perspective, the memory trait is important 
for an efficient response and forms the basis of why responders participate in training and 
exercises - to build that memory and experience set, when real events may be infrequent (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency 2020). The rules governing interactions prescribe how an agent 
interacts with others (Little 2003; Monge et al. 2003). These rules are not necessarily static and 
Monge et al. (2003) even proposes that they are not rules but meta rules, where agents choose 
to follow or change the rules depending on the circumstances. Similar comments have been made 
by Gideon et al. (2005) about components following rules and practices laid out by management 
in order to become part of the larger system. Stochastic behavior of agents, such as deciding to 
follow rules or not, is beyond the scope of this research. This research will focus instead on events 
with a predetermined structure such as the incident command system (ICS), due to the 
requirement for emergency response to follow the ICS structure per Federal Emergency 
Management guidelines. However, it is noted in literature (Moynihan (2009) and (Bennet 2011) 
for example) that responders do not always adhere to this requirement.  
Crutchfield and Young (1989) define simplicity of a system as the ability to mathematically reduce 
its behavior without information loss. In their definition, simplicity does not vary linearly with the 
level of information content in the system. Systems that exhibit periodic behavior are considered 
to be just as simple as systems that exhibit truly random behavior because in both cases the 
systems can be mathematically represented using periodic and stochastic equations, respectively, 
and therefore can be reduced without any information loss. Hence, for both periodic and 
stochastic systems the information content is considered to be low, while the information content 
is considered to be higher for systems exhibiting not truly random behavior. Hence, their 
definition of complexity is a measure of the inability to reduce a system mathematically without 
loss of information. Such complex systems tend to be in between the extremes of periodic 
systems and systems that exhibit true random behavior, because they cannot be mathematically 
reduced without information loss using either periodic or stochastic equations. These systems are 
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often considered to be chaotic and of medium information content. Formally, Crutchfield and 
Young (1989) define complexity as: 
“The … approach is an abstract notion of complexity: the information contained in the 
minimum number of equivalence classes obtained by reducing a data set modulo a 
symmetry.” 
“The equivalence classes” represent the reducible information in the system. This may reflect 
repetitive patterns in the structure of the system. The “symmetry” is the expected or standard 
reference value. Hence, a standard pattern may be considered to be a symmetry. A simple system 
could then be reduced to an exact integer number, say n, of the pattern without any information 
loss. However, if the system has information that is lost in representing it using n patterns, then 
a measure of the lost information, or the remainder of the system after the symmetry is removed 
(i.e., the “modulo”) may be considered to represent a measure of its complexity. This concept is 
echoed by Bertelsen (2003) who states complex systems cannot be completely reduced without 
information loss. The modulo, hence becomes, the indication of complexity from the perspective 
of the chosen symmetry. In this interpretation, the measure of complexity of a system is sensitive 
to context, as the choice of symmetry can change the reducibility of a system. Typically, the 
symmetry value may be based on prior data, field standards, or experiences. The choice of 
symmetry also defines the perspective of inquiry, meaning the reducibility of a system is 
predicated on the area of interest. This idea is also stated by (Gell-Mann and Lloyd 2004) who 
noted that complexity is subjective to context.  
In related literature, López-Ruiz et al. (1995) discuss the concept of “disequilibrium” as a measure 
of the distance from the mean state. As a system diverges from the expected point of stable 
equilibrium, the disequilibrium increases, indicating an increase in the measure of complexity in 
the system. This idea echoes the discussion of complexity as per Crutchfield and Young (1989). 
The system modulo a given symmetry is analogous to a deviation from a point of equilibrium, and 
the remainder value is analogous to the extent of the deviation. Hence, the difference, as well as 
the extent of disequilibrium, can be used as an indicator of complexity. This leads to the question 
of “How much disequilibrium or deviance is too much before the system either collapses or 
becomes too much of a risk?” (Hall 2003). Bertelsen and Koskela (2005) describe the 
disequilibrium as a variance - a cause for concern for part manufacturing but using the same idea- 
disequilibrium causes uncertainty. System resilience, robustness, and risk are not addressed in 
this dissertation but recommended for future work. 
Construction operations can be represented using activity cycle diagrams due to their inherent 
repetitive nature. At the project level, linear and repetitive projects can also be represented as a 
sequence of repeating activities based on unit production rates. These repeating patterns provide 
the ability to select meaningful equivalence classes and symmetries. Context will drive such a 
choice based on whether the inquiry is at the operation, project or management level (Gell-Mann 
2002). A question such as “Is this a financially complex project?” might indicate one result, but for 
the same project, “Is there scheduling complexity?” might yield a different result. The idea of 
context is echoed by ICCPM (2012) who described the problem as using “multiple metaphors and 
dialects” to obtain different perspectives on the problem. 
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2.3 Foundational Work: Measuring Complexity 
Previous works on system complexity have focused on posterior assessment and the classification 
of projects as “complex” or “not complex”. There is, however, a need to define and develop a 
metric for complexity based on an identification of factors that directly contribute to project 
complexity (Gidado 1996). Without such a metric, it is not possible to reduce system complexity 
or engineer a system to be more resilient to complexity.  
Previous research (Dao et al. 2016; Owens et al. 2012) has used the Delphi method to rate and 
differentiate between the extent to which factors, such as cost, design, project context, project 
finances, infrastructure size, infrastructure interconnectivity, infrastructure newness, and project 
uncertainty, contribute to project complexity (Safapour et al. 2018). In their approach, using the 
highest ranked factors, Owens (2012) selected and investigated five case studies by interviewing 
the project participants involved. The research by Owens (2012) and additional research by Vidal 
et al. (2011) identified factors that tend to correlate with, or are markers of, complex projects. 
While the results of this research can be used to rate the complexity of a project based on a list 
of criteria, they stop short of directly identifying a general set of conditions and project 
characteristics that give rise to complexity. The recommendations also provide limited guidance 
on ways to re-engineer projects to reduce the complexity at the source. The qualitative nature of 
the study and the generalization from expert opinion based on five case studies limit the long-
term applicability of the research as innovation and technology continue to shape project means 
and methods.  
Remington and Pollack (2007) identified characteristics of complex systems as hierarchy, 
communication, control, emergence, phase transition, non-linearity, adaptiveness, and sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions. A discussion of these characteristics follows.  
Control is defined by Remington and Pollack (2007) as the ability of the overall system to maintain 
order and carry out the overall objectives - even with the individually linked yet semi-autonomous 
units operating simultaneously. Whitty and Maylor (2007) discuss the difficulty of controlling 
projects when individual agents are interacting but are simultaneously dynamically changing. 
Gransberg et al. (2013) noted that as complexity increases the ability for a project manager to 
maintain control decreases in complex projects. 
Emergence occurs when the level of interaction among the components of a system reaches a 
critical point and the overall system accomplishes tasks that requires the entire system (i.e. not 
by any individual components) (Remington and Pollack 2016). These tasks may or may not be the 
intended objective of the overall system or may or may not even be productive for the system. 
Multiple sources commonly refer to this by saying “the system is greater than the sum of its parts” 
(Remington and Pollack 2007, Whitty and Maylor 2007, Paina and Peters 2012, Gideon et al. 2005, 
Manson 2001). Whitty and Maylor (2007) note a lack of sufficient tools to determine what 
interventions that managers could take to be effective in complex projects to compensate for 
unintended emergent issues.  
Phase transition is described as a “radical” change in the form of operation of the same system 
components to accommodate changing parameters (Remington and Pollack 2007, Eusgeld et al. 
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2011, Paina and Peters 2012). This varies from adaptiveness in that it is not changing the internal 
components (or agents) but is reconfiguring them to perform a different function. Adaptiveness, 
in contrast, may change the internal components to improve the overall system to meet new 
objectives (Whitty and Maylor 2007).  However, Eusgeld et al. (2011) noted tools are lacking to 
analyze and model these adaptive systems.  
Non-linearity is a result of feedback to the system from other system components (Remington 
and Pollack 2007, Eusgeld et al. 2011). The information gained through dynamic feedback loops 
influences the components of the system and provides the basis for the adaption or phase 
transitions that may take place. The communication is the medium through which the data moves, 
but the dynamic feedback contains the information that can reinforce plans or alter the direction 
of the operation (Paina and Peters 2012). This concept is reinforced by Murray et al. (2007) who 
found a greater number of interactions (communication) does not automatically mean greater 
connectivity (useful data). Unaddressed in the work by Murray et. al (2007), is the lag time in 
feedback loops and their impact on the overall system. 
The organizational hierarchy of complex systems is often described as a system-of-systems 
whereby each individual sub-component can (normally) operate independently but also have the 
ability to combine into a complex system when needed (Gideon et al. 2005; Remington and 
Pollack 2016). Using smaller units of operation, large tasks can be broken into manageable pieces 
and distributed. One area not addressed in this definition is the diminishing returns of distributed 
work processing, i.e., addressing the balance point between parallel processing of tasks verses 
the overhead needed to manage all of the agents. Gideon et al. (2005) has developed a taxonomy 
for systems-of-systems based on their design, operation, and domain.  
The International Centre for Complex Project Management Standards (2012) classify projects as 
complex if the project is emergent, adaptive with sensitivity to initial conditions, and contains 
feedback loops (ICCPM 2012); characteristics that are also supported by Remington and Pollack 
(2007) in their study of system complexity. It has been suggested that a pathway to improving 
efficiency and reducing delays in project management is to assess and address the challenges 
presented by complexity of projects (ICCPM 2012; Owens et al. 2012).  
Complex system characteristics, specifically feedback systems, organizational hierarchy, and 
control are examined through the lens of communication. Communication channels are the links 
between the components of a system. System performance is an indication of the strength of 
those links. Matisziw et al. (2012) examined the structure and performance of a network as a 
measure of network robustness. They determined that nodal interactions, when dynamic, 
significantly impacted the robustness of a network. This is because certain edges or nodes in a 
network have higher importance and therefore have a higher impact on the stability of the 
network (Matisziw et al. 2010). Their objective was to identify locations on the network that could 
be reinforced and fortified to improve its survivability in the event of an attack. From a volume of 
information perspective, Miller (1956) found that an individual’s maximum manageable 
interactions is “about” seven. Flood (1987) calls this the “threshold of complexity”. FEMA (2018) 
calls this the “span of control” and suggests that it be limited to 5 individuals or resources for 
every 1 supervisor. To compensate beyond this threshold, Miller (1956) found that people begin 
to chunk information or package it into larger pieces, often with less detail. Further work is needed 
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to examine the impact of this information chunking. Further work should examine the rate of 
information flow between the manager and multiple individual agents and how the cycle of 
information gathering and sharing is impacted. There is an interesting parallel with work done by 
Payne (1976) regarding decision making by individuals. That work noted that in a complex 
situation, decision makers used an “elimination by aspects” to filter out alternative options in 
order to make a decision. This is effectively discarding information intentionally when there is too 
much information to process. 
Attempts at measuring complexity in health care system scaling research have compared cross-
sectional case studies. Their objective is to use internal system dynamics as a method of 
identifying critical management points, scenario planning and exercise activities with dynamic 
rules (Paina and Peters 2012). The results indicate that dynamic interactions, stakeholder 
participation, and local conditions were all important components in the scaling of health 
systems. McCabe (1976) measured complexity in computer programming as the number of 
potential paths a program can follow using graph theory. Although feedback loops are accounted 
for in this metric, the “interactions” between agents is limited or fixed. Attempts to measure 
system complexity have also included using statistical methods using entropy as a model (López-
Ruiz et al. 1995).  They discuss the idea of a “disequilibrium” as a measure of the distance from 
the probable likely (mean) state. This is multiplied with an information variable (representing 
information stored in the system), to give a measure of complexity. As an example, if the likely 
probable state has a disequilibrium of zero, the complexity of the system is zero (López-Ruiz et al. 
1995). This approach does not account for the number of interactions of the system specifically. 
Gidado (1996) developed a measure of complexity but limited it to the length and cost of a project 
and did not address other objectives. The Gidado (1996) measure was based on the number of 
components and the duration of the workflow. Finally, Austin et al. (2002) discuss the advantage 
of using graphical models to visualize complexity, noting that graphical models can lead to a 
greater understanding of the information flow in a system. 
While reducibility of projects has been discussed in this research, as a way to reduce failures of 
information flow, there is a tension between the goals of reducing project complexity and still 
maintaining a robust system that is capable of adapting to component failures. Research has been 
conducted by Gribble (2001), Iyer et al. (2013), and Paul et al. (2004) examining the robustness of 
networks when nodes or edges are removed and examine the ability of the network to continue 
to function. This work identifies critical nodes or edges which, if removed, causes network failure. 
Using the research from this dissertation, the previous work leads to the questions: is it better to 
have a less robust system (more prone to failure) or a less complex network, less prone to 
disequilibrium (delay, information loss) and failure? Does a robust network require complexity? 
It is important to note that much of the network research is based on infrastructure or social 
networks, that do not have a “project” objective the network is “trying to accomplish”. Therefore, 
the failure of a “node” or component in a project system does not necessarily preclude another 
component from taking over the vacant role (i.e., if the project manager is suddenly incapacitated, 
a subcontractor might be able to step in and conduct that role).  
The properties of the system allow for the failures in information flow. These include, but are by 
no means limited to: 
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• Too much information for the channel to accommodate, or the receiver to process (Miller 
1956) 
• Not enough information is available for the receiver to make use of the information 
(Comfort et al., 2004) 
• Delay in the system and the information does not arrive in an acceptable timeframe to be 
used as desired (Moynihan 2009). 
2.4 Points of Departure 
A summary of the points of departure from the literature are: 
• Previous works identify indicators of complexity but not metrics to quantify a system’s 
complexity.  
• Complexity research has tended to use Delphi approaches (reliance on experts) rather 
than qualitative measures. This limits the scope of the research use to specific fields. It 
also potentially limits the application as it provides no direction on how to reduce 
complexity in the system. 
These points lead to the following research questions: 
• How is system complexity defined and measured? 
• Can information flow failures be related to changes in complexity?  
2.5 Proposal 
To answer these questions, this dissertation proposes to develop a metric of complexity that 
provides a quantitative metric and provides guidance on how to reduce complexity. 
The hypothesis of this research is that complexity is a characteristic of the organizational and 
operational structure of an event (i.e., a project or incident) based on the number and nature of 
interactions within the system.  
This hypothesis is tested across both hypothetical and real-world events to support the creation 
of a metric that measures the system complexity. Based on a review of definitions of complexity 
in mathematics and other inter-disciplinary bodies of systems literature, this research devises a 
definition that can be used in different contexts to characterize the complexity of a project or 
event. Based on the definition by Crutchfield and Young (1989), this research recognizes that the 
answer to “how complex is a project?” also depends on the context within which the question is 
posed. For instance, a project with multiple interacting operations and schedule dependencies 
may not have the same level of complexity in its financing and delivery methods. However, this 
dissertation posits that the complexity of each of these contexts can be characterized using 
identical systems and mathematical constructs of equilibrium and phase change. Based on these 
ideas, this research demonstrates that the number and nature of critical interactions within a 
system is a good measure of the project complexity, given a context specific construct. In turn, 
this number provides a simple metric that can be used by practitioners to identify interactions 
that increase the complexity in a project and engineer ways to reduce the project complexity. The 
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dissertation concludes with several case studies identifying complexity as a function of 
interactions between project components. The case studies are analyzed through the framework 
this dissertation developed to measure and reduce complexity. 
   
Figure 1: Structure of research 
Figure 1 outlines the structure of this research. The first step in testing this hypothesis is to identify 
methods of representing a system that accounts for both the number and nature of system 
component interactions. Both visual and mathematical representations will be use and are 




3 Building Blocks of Complexity 
This chapter will develop the methods of representing systems for analysis. Based on the 
literature, two of the parts of complexity are of particular interest, component interactions and 
disequilibrium which will be discussed as the number and nature of the interactions. Determining 
when there is disequilibrium and where component interactions occur is important in 
determining a system’s complexity as it highlights what is making a system complex. 
Systems are built from individual components that interact to complete the system task. 
Identifying the component interactions from the overall system behavior presents challenges as 
the component interactions are combined and may appear as one from outside the system. These 
interactions are the points of information transfer within the system. Given the objective of this 
dissertation is to determine the reason for information flow failures, identifying the transfer 
points of information is a critical step in identifying points of failure. 
Disequilibrium refers to the difference between a balanced and an unbalanced component 
interaction. In physical systems, this can be manifested as a delay or a “waiting” for one 
component to finish a task before the next task can begin. As mentioned in Chapter 2, López-Ruiz 
et al. (1995) discuss the concept of “disequilibrium” as a measure of the distance from the mean 
state. As a system diverges from the expected point of stable equilibrium, the disequilibrium 
increases, indicating an increase in the measure of complexity in the system. This idea echoes the 
discussion of complexity as per Crutchfield and Young (1989). The system modulo a given 
symmetry is analogous to a deviation from a point of equilibrium, and the remainder value is 
analogous to the extent of the deviation.  
In construction project management, the use of equilibria or balance-based principles is not 
uncommon (Yang and Ioannou 2001). Hence, combining the ideas from Crutchfield and Young 
(1989) and López-Ruiz et al. (1995), it is conjectured that the concept of disequilibrium can be 
used to indicate system complexity in that interaction. A system in disequilibrium is more 
irreducible given a symmetry, and the remainder – or the deviation from the equilibrium – can be 
considered to be an indicator of the complexity in the project component. The question at hand 
is: what are the factors that are likely to push a system out of balance or introduce a disequilibrium 
in a system? For example, in a simple construction operation design where the principle of 
continuous operation is used to balance production rates between equipment, balance is more 
difficult to achieve if there are more interacting cycles. Hence, the hypothesis is that an important 
factor contributing to the potential for deviations from the symmetry is the number of 
interactions within a system. 
Given that both component interactions and disequilibrium are the components of complexity, 
measuring the disequilibrium and the interactions is important in determining a system’s 
complexity. Since each point of interaction has the potential to be in disequilibrium, the more 
points of interaction there are, the more potential there is for disequilibrium. A key point of this 
dissertation shows: the more interactions, the more complex the system.  
A goal of this research is to take the expressions of the principals of operations and use them to 
measure complexity. Delay and mismatch of resources are examples of disequilibrium and are all 
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indications of complexity. A better understanding of complexity sheds light on operational 
efficacy. This is presented several ways: as signals, as a phase diagram, and by representing a cycle 
as a circle in the time domain. 
Graphically, cyclic systems and cyclic system components can be represented as signals 
(waveforms) with a characteristic frequency that reflects the component behavior. Using a signal 
representation allows the system to be analyzed using signal processing techniques.  
As the number of interactions increase, the number of degrees of freedom increase, which in turn, 
increase the possible states within which the system can exist. Thinking about this from the 
perspective of any given interaction between two equipment types in a system, each interaction 
has an expected pattern of behavior (the symmetry). Deviations from this expected behavior 
results in a disequilibrium (using López-Ruiz et al. (1995)) and can be measured, as the deviations 
are already quantitative in nature (e.g., dollars over budget, days over schedule, cubic yards of 
materials short, minutes spent waiting or idle). The proposed measure of complexity for this paper 
is to use the number of interactions for a given symmetry (perspective) of the project. The 
disequilibrium detected in the interaction is important, as the complexity arises from all of the 
ways in which a degree of freedom can vary and thus introduce uncertainty into the system. 
In the next section, construction operation is mathematically analyzed to show that as the number 
of interactions increase, so does the number of points at which the system can deviate from a 
desired equilibrium. This dissertation discusses how this measure can be used at all project levels 
as a method for assessing project complexity and examines several methods of measuring the 
nature and number of interactions.  
3.1 Complexity in Construction Operations 
Operations with repetitive processes, like construction processes, can be reduced to cyclic 
interactions. Each cycle has an output metric (time, productivity, etc.). At the project level, linear 
and repetitive projects can also be represented as a sequence of repeating activities based on unit 
production rates. These repeating patterns provide the ability to select meaningful equivalence 
classes and symmetries. Context will drive such a choice based on whether the inquiry is at the 
operation, project, or management level. A question such as “Is this a financially complex 
project?” might indicate one result, but for the same project, “Is there scheduling complexity?” 
might yield a different result. The analysis of these cycles determines the balance point of the 
interacting resources. At this balance point, the driving design principle is that of continuous 
operation. Continuous operation reduces delays and wait times through the uninterrupted flow 
of resources. Continuous operation also implies the system is in equilibrium, or that there is a 
balance in production rates of equipment at each interaction point leading to zero waiting times. 
However, when the production rates of equipment are unbalanced, the waiting times can become 
non-zero and vary irregularly, causing the system to move into disequilibrium. For such a system, 
estimating the net production rate becomes less reducible due to the unexpected delays and 
waiting times. This increases irreducibility of the system. Therefore, by determining the extent of 
delay, or imbalance in the system, and the number of interactions in the system that can cause 
such imbalance (disequilibrium) and irreducibility, the level of complexity can be measured.  
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Graphical models are used to visualize interactions and disequilibrium through theoretical 
examples. Real systems do not usually give off signals that can be measured, but the purpose of 
these graphical models and signal processing is to highlight methods to understand how systems 
work and components within those systems interact.  
Consider the example of a hypothetical mainline concrete paving operation. A concrete paving 
machine is being serviced by trucks that are transporting the concrete mix from a batch plant to 
the paver. The batch plant is being serviced by water trucks delivering water. The water is crucial 
for maintaining a continuous supply of ready-mix concrete, necessary for the paver to function 
continuously.  The activity cycle diagram for the operation is illustrated in Figure 2. In one cycle 
the trucks deliver concrete from the batch plant to a paver (paver cycle), while in the other cycle 
the batch plant is supplied by trucks delivering water from a water source (water cycle). Ideally, 
the number of resources will be balanced so as to minimize idle time of all of the interacting 
equipment. In Figure 2, the number of trucks in the paver cycle is seen from two directions: the 
number of trucks needed to keep the paver continuously operating: n0, and the number of trucks 
to keep the batch plant in non-stop production: n1. The condition for the paver cycle to be balance 
is, n0=n1.  
 
Figure 2: Three component construction cycle 
This relationship will be the basis for analyzing the cycle. The paver production rate is denoted by 
P (in cubic yards of concrete per hour), the batch plant production rate is C (in cubic yards of 
concrete per hour), the water required in the batch plant is G (in gallons per cubic yard of concrete 
produced), and the water supply from the source is W (in gallons per hour). In addition, n2, 
denotes the number of water trucks needed to keep the batch plant in continuous operation.  
The number of water trucks needed (n2) to keep batch plant in continuous operation is:  





 ( 2 ) 
If CCT is the capacity of the truck (in cubic yards) then the number of concrete trucks (n1) servicing 
the batch plant each hour to keep the batch plant in continuous operation is:  





 ( 4 ) 
The number of concrete trucks (n0) needed to keep the paver in continuous operation each hour 
is: 
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 ( 11 ) 
At the balance point, the system is in equilibrium, and the expected production of the system is 
easily reducible from the primary production rates P, G, C and W. However, if the system is not in 
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equilibrium (i.e. n0≠n1), delays are present in the system and there is a higher level of complexity 
as the number of variables cannot be related and reduced without knowledge of the extra variable 
CCT. This increases the level of complexity in the system.  
The equilibrium conditions as a function of the number of trucks (dimensionless parameters) can 
be analyzed as follows: 
• If n0>n1, the paver production is greater than the batch plant (P>C). This is not physically 
possible (an inviable state) but is a mathematical solution indicating that the paver is idle. 
• If n0<n1, the batch plant production is greater than the paver (P<C), and the batch plant is 
idle. 
The summary of these results is listed in Table 1. The production rates for the paver and batch 
plant are represented by P0 and C0 respectively.  
 













P=P0 C=C0 n0/n1 > 
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n0/n1=1 None P0 3 2 
Table 1 also illustrates the possible states that the system can exist in. For this system, there are 
5 interactions if n0≠n1: 
• Trucks (n0) with batch plant 
• Trucks (n0) with paver 
• Trucks (n1) with batch plant 
• Trucks (n1) with paver 
• Batch plant and water truck 
But, if n0=n1, the interactions reduce to 3: 
• Trucks (n0) with batch plant 
• Trucks (n0) with paver 
• Batch plant and water truck 
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Therefore, by eliminating the delay (disequilibrium) in the system, the number of interactions is 
reduced. For a system, as the number of states increase, so do the degrees of freedom of the 
system, and therefore the complexity of the system increases from the batch plan perspective. 
3.2 Phase Diagram 
A phase diagram can be used to illustrate the possible states in which a particular interaction of 
the system can exist. In two dimensions, Figure 3 illustrates the phase diagram for the 
construction paving example showing the possible states in which the production rates of the 
paver, batch plant, and the overall system can relate to each other. Below the balance point (P=C), 
the equipment driving production is the paver, and above the balance point, the equipment 
driving production is the batch plant. In the phase diagram representation (Figure 3), 
disequilibrium would be represented by the distance between system production line and the 
production of the paver (if P<C), or the batch plant (if P>C) (discussed later in Figure 24. The 
complexity is the number of interactions of the system - when P=C, there are two interactions 
(plus the water truck interaction which is not shown in the phase diagram). However, as the 
number of interactions increase so do the number of possible phases, the degrees of freedom, 
and the available of deviations from the system equilibrium, meaning the complexity increases. 
 
Figure 3: Phase diagram of paving construction example 
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3.3 Circular Representation 
A circle is an effective way of representing a cycle, especially if there are multiple interacting cycles 
involving multiple equipment. Consider the example of a gravel quarry operation involving a single 
excavator and a number of trucks (n1) working in tandem to excavate aggregate for a batch plant. 
Figure 4 shows the activity cycle diagram consisting of two cycles.  
The truck cycle period is (time to load D0, travel to batch plant t12, unload D1 and travel back t11) 
denoted by T1. Hence, the following can be asserted: 
 𝑇" = D% + 𝑡"" + 𝑡"! + D" ( 12 ) 
In this example, a single excavator requires n0 cycles to load a single truck. The excavator cycle 
period (time to swing, cut, and dump in the truck) is denoted by T0. Hence, the following can be 
asserted: 
 𝑛%𝑇% = D% ( 13 ) 
Then n1 trucks are needed to balance the excavator production and ensure continuous operation.  
 𝑛"D% = 𝑇" ( 14 ) 
 
 
Figure 4: Example with an excavator and trucks. The excavator requires multiple cycles to load a 
truck. 
Given the periodicity of cycles, the cycle time (or period, T1) of the truck can be represented by 
the locus of a point around the circumference of a circle (Figure 5). This requires the theoretical 
construct of a radius of the cycle, R1, such that: 
 2𝜋𝑅" = 𝑇" ( 15 ) 
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The circle represents the cycle time for the truck akin to a period. The partial hypocycloid inscribed 
in the circle represents the truck/excavator interactions. This hypocycloid is the locus of a fixed 
point on a circle with radius R0 that is rolling inside the circle with radius R1, where the radius R0 
corresponds to the cycle time of the excavator T0 such that: 
 2𝜋𝑅% = 𝑇% ( 16 ) 
 
Figure 5: Balanced circle representation of excavator and truck interactions. 
Figure 5 represents only the cycle time of one truck. The three interaction points in it shows that 
it takes three cycles of the excavator (n0 = 3) to completely load one truck. Once loaded, the truck 
continues on with the rest of its cycle traversing the circumference of the outer circle, until it 
returns back to interact with the excavator again – this time is denoted by: t11 + t12 + D1. For a 
perfectly balanced operation this is the same time that the excavator will use to load the other 
trucks. As there are n1 trucks, it can therefore be asserted that:   
 (𝑛" − 1)D% = 𝑡"" + 𝑡"! +	D" ( 17 ) 
Figure 6 is replicated for each additional truck, with the excavator interactions seamlessly moving 
from one truck circle to the next as the excavator continues to load each truck without stopping. 
If the operation is perfectly balanced, with continuous operation, then each of the truck circles in 
Figure 6 can be superimposed into a single circle that represents all of the trucks and the 
excavator) and is illustrated in Figure 7.  
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Figure 6: Excavator/truck interactions with multiple trucks. 
 
Figure 7: Summation of truck/excavator interactions. The intersections between the circle and 
the hypocycloid are the interaction points between the trucks and the excavator. 
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Hence, the single balanced interaction between the n1 trucks with cycle time T1 and one excavator 
with cycle time T0, requiring n0 cycles to load a single truck can be illustrated as a complete 
hypocycloid with a circle of radius R0 rolling inside the circle of radius R1. Combining equations 13 
and 14, yielding: 




 ( 19 ) 
Hence, for a system in equilibrium, the product of the number of trucks and excavator cycles (or 
number of excavators) is the ratio of the cycle times. n0 and n1 must be integers, therefore the 
constraints on loading times and production rates are less flexible. When additional interacting 
equipment cycles are added, this formulation can be recursively extended as illustrated in Figure 
8. The system equations can be expressed generally as follows: 
 𝑛&"𝑇&" = ∆" ( 20 ) 
Where n'1 is the number of trucks to keep the batch plant busy, T'1 is the cycle time of the trucks 
to keep the batch plant busy, and ∆" is the truck unloading time.  
 
Figure 8: Adding a loader that takes the material from the truck to a batch plant. 
The total cycle time of the loader, T2, is a function of the unloading time of the truck ∆", the travel 
times of the loader (t21 and t22). 
 ∆" + 𝑡!" + 𝑡!! + ∆!= 𝑇! ( 21 ) 
The number of trucks needed at ∆" is: 
 𝑇!
∆"
= 𝑛! ( 22 ) 
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The loader time to transport and unload gives:   
 (𝑛! − 1)∆"= 𝑡!" + 𝑡!! + ∆! ( 23 ) 
Substituting equation 23 into equation 21 gives:  
 (𝑛! − 1)∆"= 𝑇! − ∆" ( 24 ) 
Distributing ∆" out and using equation 20 to substitute for ∆" 
 𝑛!𝑛&"𝑇
&
" = 𝑇! ( 25 ) 
 
 𝐼𝑓	𝑛&" = 𝑛"	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑇&" = 𝑇" ( 26 ) 
then, the system is balanced. This provides the product of the number of loaders and trucks with 
the truck cycle time is equal to the cycle time of the loader:   
 𝑛!𝑛"𝑇" = 𝑇! ( 27 ) 
Substituting in for the excavator cycle time T0 and the number of cycles of the excavator, n0: 
 𝑛!𝑛"(𝑛"𝑛%𝑇%) = 𝑇! ( 28 ) 
 𝑛%𝑛"!𝑛!𝑇% = 𝑇! ( 29 ) 
Therefore, the cycle time Tm of any equipment in the construction cycle can be related to the 
quantity of other equipment and the initial equipment cycle time T0 by: 








𝑇% ( 31 ) 
Equation 31 allows us to mathematically express the balance conditions for an operation with m 
interaction points. 
The expansion of systems can occur in multiple directions. Systems can be linear (as in Figure 8) 
or can be in branch configurations (Figure 9). Additional equipment and additional interactions 
increase the potential for disequilibrium (more intersections must align, reducing the solution 
space). As the number of interactions increases, the layers of the circle diagram increase. Figure 
10 shows the concept of nested circle diagrams. Each level (nested circle) represents another 
equipment component. The radius of each circle is determined by equation 15.  
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Figure 9: Branch configuration of a system. 
 
Figure 10: Nested circle diagram. Each layer represents a component interaction. 
In a circular representation of a system, disequilibrium would appear as an incongruence of the 
inner hypocycloid and outer circle. The incongruence can be expressed as a phase angle difference 
or as a time delay. Figure 11 illustrates the truck excavator example with delay ε in the system.   
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Figure 11: Unbalanced circle representation of truck and excavator interactions. 
The equations for an unbalanced system must account for ε. Equation 14 is modified to: 





 ( 33 ) 
And from equation 13: 
 𝑛%𝑇% = D% ( 34 ) 
Becomes: 
 𝑛"𝑛%𝑇% = 𝑇" − 𝑛"	ε ( 35 ) 





 ( 36 ) 
The phase diagram and circular diagram are not both ideal indicators for all systems. For systems 
that need multiple interactions with the same equipment types (for example, the excavator taking 
multiple cycles to load a truck), the circular representation provides a better visual indication of 
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multiple cycle interactions. However, for a single interaction (one cycle for each equipment) the 
phase diagram provides a more useful depiction of the interactions.  
3.4 Waveform Representation 
Using the example of an excavator and truck in a digging, loading, hauling system, (Figure 12) the 
excavator and truck each can be represented by a waveform and their interactions and 
disequilibrium visually seen.  
 
Figure 12: Example with an excavator and trucks. The excavator requires multiple cycles to load 
a truck. 
Starting from the number of trucks n1, the truck cycle period T1 is the cycle time results in the 
following parameters of the waveform (note, normally signals are referred to in Hertz (Hz) or 
cycles per second. However, in this dissertation, the frequency will be represented in cycles per 
unit time or CPT for notation purposes as the frequency in Hertz would be very small and 




 ( 37 ) 
The frequency is a function of the cycle period. As the truck is the reference component in this 
example, the frequency is assigned as 1 CPT. 
 𝑓" =1	CPT 
 ( 38 ) 
• n1= 4, the number of trucks is 4 for this example. 
• n0=3, as it takes 3 excavator cycles to fill the truck. 
• 𝜀 is the delay when either component (truck or excavator) needs to wait for the other. 
Non-zero values of 𝜀	indicate an unbalanced system (disequilibrium).  
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Using these parameters, the signal for the truck is given by: 
 𝑦" = sin(𝑓" ∗ (𝑡 − 𝜀)) ( 39 ) 
 𝑦" = sin(1 ∗ (𝑡 − 𝜀)) ( 40 ) 
Plotting for several cycles produces the plot in Figure 13 showing the truck waveform. For these 
plots there is no y-labeling as the y-value is a construct derived from equation 15. Key takeaway 
from these plots is the relative frequency to each component. 
 
Figure 13: Waveform of a single truck. 
Similarly, for the excavator, the frequency is n0 x n1. This is due to the 3 excavator cycles needed 
to load a truck, and then the truck cycle period being 4 times the truck loading time. 
 
 𝑓! =𝑛% ∗ 𝑛" = 3 ∗ 4 = 12 ( 41 ) 
 y! = sin(12 ∗ (𝑡 − 𝜀)) ( 42 ) 





Figure 14: Waveform of excavator 
Of interest, is the combination of these waveforms to determine the system waveform 
interactions. Figure 15 shows the sum of the truck and excavator waveforms.  
 
Figure 15: Sum of truck and excavator waveform. 
To analyze the combined waveform, a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) is used (equation 43) to 
decompose the combined signal into its component frequencies. The FFT is a computationally 
efficient algorithm to calculate the Fourier transform of a discrete time signal (note, while the 
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actual signals in these examples are continuous, they can be represented by discrete time 
simulations (such as in the plots in this research). The plots in this dissertation look at a small 
segment of the signal, usually 1 to 1.5 cycles. Therefore, in order to improve the frequency 
resolution, the signals are zero padded to increase the signal length up to next “power of 2” 
number of samples (N2). Additionally, the sampling is greater than twice the Nyquist rate to 
ensure aliasing is not occurring, which would provide erroneous results in the frequency domain 
plots, and the number of samples (N) are sufficiently large as to be an integer number of periods 
to avoid time leakage.  
The FFT shows the two frequencies. Using the method of a FFT is not bidirectional. First, projects 
or emergency responses do not have signals to record. Second, while the FFT can be used to 
decompose signals into component frequencies, this does not necessarily indicate the number of 
interactions. However, this method is intended to show that interacting components can generate 
signals and the FFT can show how the inherent structure of a project/event can be visualized as 





, 𝑓𝑜𝑟	0 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑁 − 1 
Where, X(k) is the kth harmonic and X(n) is the nth input sample. 
( 43 ) 
Plotting the FFT of the summation of the truck and excavator signals (Figure 16) indicates the 
presents of two frequencies: 1 and 12 CPT, matching the input frequencies for this example. 
The next question is: what happens as the number of system components grows? If there is a 
third component (a loader for example that the truck dumps into), how does the additional 
component impact the system waveform. As expected, the addition of another component’s 
waveform shows up on the FFT as another frequency present (Figure 17). This pattern continues 
to scale as additional components are added. Figure 18 shows an example with 5 components. As 
the number of components N goes to infinite, the number of frequencies present will also go 
infinite, provided they are unique frequencies. Repeated frequencies will show up as stronger 
signal strength in the FFT magnitude plot. 
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Figure 16: The sum of two components and the FFT magnitude and phase of the sum.  
 
Figure 17: Summation of three signals. The three frequencies are present in the second plot.  
31 
 
Figure 18: Summation of 4 signals, the FFT magnitude, and phase 
Additional comparisons of frequencies are included in 6A 
3.4.1 Infinite Components 
As the number of components or interactions increases to infinity, the waveform continues to 
evolve. Figure 19 shows what happens for very large numbers of components at random 
frequencies. As the number of frequencies increases, the overall of the sum will continue to 
increase. Figure 20 shows the sum of large numbers of frequency waveforms but with a linear 
increase in frequency rather than random frequencies. The implication is that emergence is not 
just a function of interactions but the order or topology of those interactions impacts the results. 
Once conjecture is that the differing results between the random and sequential frequency 
summations are an artifact of sampling. 
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Figure 19: Sum of very large numbers of frequencies (n=50,000 random frequencies) and the FFT 
normalized magnitude showing the random frequencies used. 
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Figure 20: Sum for very large number of frequencies (n=50,000, linearly increasing) and the FFT 
normalized magnitude. 
3.4.2 Unbalanced Systems 
These examples thus far have assumed the system is in equilibrium (balanced). However, if the 
system has delay (disequilibrium) the waveform is impacted. The plots in Figure 21 show the 
excavator waveform “waiting” followed by its next three cycles. This makes a noticeable impact 
when the truck and excavator waveforms are added. The FFT is also computed and shows two 
frequencies present (1 CPT and 4 CPT) as before as well as a small indication of a signal at 7.6 CPT. 
This additional frequency is a result of the delay in the system skewing the “true” frequency of 
the excavator waveform.   
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Figure 21: Two component signals with the excavator signal delayed by 0.025. 
As the delay increases, the results of the FFT of the sum of the truck and excavator waveforms 
are similar (Figure 22), with additional harmonic frequencies present. This result means that as 
the delay in the system increases, the disequilibrium increases.  
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Figure 22: As delay increases, the FFT indicates additional frequencies present as harmonics. 
Next, combining both 5 frequencies (components), each at a different delay, produces Figure 23 
which shows the summation waveform. The FFT of the waveform, however, shows the 5 
frequencies present but also the harmonics resulting from the delays in the component 
waveforms. The result shows the FFT can be used to identify the frequency components of 
interacting components can help visualize the underlying system and the impact of delay 
(disequilibrium) in a system.  
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Figure 23: Results of varying both frequency and delay. 
3.5 Metric of Complexity 
There are four primary takeaways from the methods discussed above: 
1. From the paver example in Figure 2, the system is not in equilibrium, estimating the net 
production rate requires additional variables (n1) that can be eliminated when the system 
is in equilibrium. Thus, a system in equilibrium is more easily reducible than a system in 
disequilibrium and requires management of fewer information parameters. The phase 
diagram (Figure 3) helps identify the conditions under which equilibrium can be 
maintained (when P=C in the Figure 3 example) while the phase diagram in Figure 24 
shows a system that is in disequilibrium because n0/n1 is not equal to 1, and therefore, 
the operating point is not at the balance point - causing the paver to be idle. The 
disequilibrium makes these cases irreducible and according to the definition by 
Crutchfield and Young (1989), higher complexity. 
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Figure 24: Phase diagram showing disequilibrium at the operating point. 
2. The circular diagrams indicate that as the number of interactions increase so do the 
number of balance points, in a multiplicative fashion, adding to the number of potential 
deviations from equilibrium conditions, and combinations thereof. This leads to a very 
large number of possible irreducibilities in the system. 
3. Realistically, systems tend to equilibrium conditions, but rarely function in perfect 
equilibrium. In addition, the extent of movement away from an equilibrium condition can 
also be difficult to measure and translate into an easily applicable metric (e.g., consider 
developing a distribution of delay times). However, reducing the number of interactions 
can reduce the number of ways in which a system can deviate from equilibrium, and 
reduce the number of possible points that need to be managed. Managing the level of 
disequilibrium at each interaction, or minimizing the deviation at each balance point, can 
help reduce the complexity of the project. In other words, an operation design with fewer 
interactions and operating close to the balance point conditions will have a lower 
complexity and will be likely to have better project objective outcomes.  
4. Using the Fast Fourier Transform of the combined waveforms will identify the component 
waveform frequencies helping to reveal the underlying structure of the system. The 
disequilibrium is identified by the appearance of harmonic frequencies. 
Hence, this dissertation posits that complexity is a function of the number of interactions because 
these are points where disequilibrium can exist. The disequilibrium is the indication of an 
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information flow failure, but the complexity is the number of interactions. To reduce complexity, 
the objective is to reduce the number of driving interactions and manage the project to ensure 
that each interaction is as close to equilibrium conditions as possible.  
Therefore, the proposed metric of complexity is the number of defining interactions in the system, 
given a management principle. As the number of interactions increases, so do the degrees of 
freedom for the system. As degrees of freedom increase, each interaction has the possibility of 
being in disequilibrium from the expected or normal value. Disequilibrium is demonstrated in the 
components of analysis: block diagram, waveforms analysis, phase diagram, circular diagram, and 
equation 31. These are all representations of cycles and show interaction points and 
disequilibrium between components.  
3.6 Organizational Complexity 
So far, the discussion has used operational examples to illustrate how the number of interactions 
is a metric of complexity. However, the same metric can be very usefully applied to organizational 
systems as well. In the case of construction operations, the continuous operation principle is used 
as a symmetry to assess system reducibility by establishing balance points as equilibrium 
conditions. Organizationally, similar principles that reduce lag times and improve communication 
cycle times can be used to define a symmetry that reflects the context at hand.  For example, 
consider the following hypothetical scenario depicted in Figure 25: The contractor (hired by an 
Owner) has 4 sub-contractors. Each sub-contractor can be in a fiscal state of “under budget”, “on 
budget”, or “over budget”. In this case, the symmetry is the budget (“on budget”). There are 5 
interactions (between the contractor and each sub-contractor, and the owner and the 
contractor). The measure of complexity is a function of the number of interactions (in this case 
5). There is disequilibrium in 4 of the 5 interactions.  
 
Figure 25: Interactions between contractor, owner, and sub-contractors 
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Consolidating these interactions (i.e., reducing the number of sub-contractors) can reduce the 
number of degrees of freedom in the system and thus the complexity of the project. This approach 
to assessing complexity of a project also has the advantage of emphasizing the structure of the 
organization as a function of the number of driving interactions rather than just the overall system 
size.  
3.7 Parallels in Other Systems 
There are several potential parallels of this work to systems in other fields. Controls and signal 
processing share a similar mathematical background with feedback, gain, control, and filtering. 
Geographical Information Systems also have parallels with the idea of disequilibrium described in 
this dissertation and through the use of symmetry. These parallels are not addressed in this 
dissertation but are potential points of departure for future work. 
The field of network stability also uses much of the same language as project management when 
discussing disequilibrium and complexity. For example, Johansson and Hassel (2010) state that 
critical infrastructures “often have high degrees of complexity”. Also there is discussion in the 
literature regarding interdependencies (Rinaldi 2004) between infrastructure components that 
translate well into this dissertation’s discussion on component interactions.  
This chapter has developed methods to represent systems visually and mathematically and 
analyze their interactions by number and nature. Next these methods and representations 
developed in this chapter will be applied to projects in chapter 4.   
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4 Complexity in Service System Operation 
Three case studies are used to illustrate the use of the metric for complexity. A distinction is made 
between systems that have pre-determined structure verses systems that are organized ad hoc. 
The former project involves planning that reflects the underlying domain structure. For example, 
in a construction project, there is a schedule outlining agreed upon start and end dates and a work 
breakdown structure that reflects the sequence and duration of tasks to be performed. Hence, a 
construction operation is represented using cycle diagrams and production rates are measured as 
a function of cycle times. This is in stark contrast to an emergency response that is typically an ad 
hoc operation with volunteer involvement and a structure that emerges in an unplanned way out 
of the needs and urgency of the moment. Planning and exercises do take place to develop the 
“symmetry”, a general frame of reference for a type of incident. However, the actual situation on 
the ground sometimes lends itself to an ad hoc state of operation, where components operate 
based on the general planning guidelines that may be in place. In operations where there is little 
to no prior planning in place, components extensively rely on the experience of past events and 
exercises. The following case studies include a construction project involving pre-construction 
(project) planning. The two emergency response case studies are ad hoc events where the 
responders and incident management team rely on general emergency operation plans, but 
primarily on experience from previous events and exercises. 
The reason for assessing both the planned and ad hoc organizations is to test if the following 
fundamental questions can be applied to both, and if so, what the conclusions can be drawn about 
the complexity from the mathematical analysis in the last chapter:  
• Is there disequilibrium in the interactions and is this causing information flow failures? 
• How is the measure of complexity applied in this case and what is that measure? 
• Can the measure of complexity be used to reduce the complexity in the system? 
4.1 Construction Operations 
4.1.1 Case Study: Rock River Project 
Using the methods and concepts of complexity and disequilibrium discussed in Chapter 3, this 
dissertation will analyze the case of the Morgan Street Bridge in Rockford, Illinois as an example 
of how reducing the number of interactions can reduce the complexity of a project. 
4.1.1.1 Project Background and Context 
The Morgan Street Bridge project replaced the aging 900-foot spandrel concrete arched vehicle 
bridge over the Rock River (Figure 26) in Rockford, Illinois. Originally built in 1890 to connect the 
east and west parts of Rock River, the replacement of the bridge was seen by the city as an 
opportunity to jumpstart the city’s efforts for urban renewal (Prange 2013). Revitalizing 
neighborhoods on both sides of the bridge was an objective of the city and the bridge was seen 
as an integral component of the community. As the owner, the city solicited input from the 
community, believing that the bridge could serve as the centerpiece for community 
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redevelopment. Input was solicited throughout the design and construction phases using a 
context-sensitive solution process. The project objectives, which are the project symmetry, 
developed through the input received from focus groups, interviews, and surveys were: 
• Increase traffic capacity 
• Improve safety for vehicles and pedestrians 
• Improve mobility to both sides of the river (including pedestrians) 
• Enhance aesthetics of the area 
• Accommodate fishing from the bridge 
• Anchor the redevelopment of the surrounding community 
Based on the community input, the design selected for the replacement structure was a network 
tied arch bridge. Due to the cost estimate of the project (baseline cost was $21.8 million), the 
Federal Highways Administration required a Value Engineering study (Prange 2013). The 
expectations of the study were low, as the project was considered a typical construction project 
with mostly known variables. The Value Engineering study team was composed of 14 individuals 
including members from the Illinois Department of Transportation, representatives from the city, 
utilities, railroad relocation specialists, construction specialists, and a Value Engineering 
facilitator. The study group was broken into five teams: Bridge, Railway, General, Design 
Suggestions, and an Out-of-Scope group. Each group was asked to develop proposals that would 
reduce costs or add to the objectives of the project (Prange 2013). 
 
Figure 26: Map of project area 
42 
The Value Engineering process took place during a two-day workshop. During the workshop, 78 
proposals were created. After deliberation, the Value Engineering team recommended 11 
proposals of which 9 proposals were accepted, resulting in savings to the project of $1.6 million 
(Prange 2013). Three of the most unexpected proposals were:  
1. Remove the rail line from under the bridge on the east embankment.  
2. Reuse the concrete from bridge demolition (and from an additional project the 
city was undertaking nearby) for fill on the river embankment.  
3. Add a roundabout at the Seminary Road intersection east of the bridge.  
These three projects resulted in a savings of $1.26 million and furthered the goals of the project 
(Prange 2013). 
The first proposal was the result of an attempt to reduce the cost of maintaining rail operations 
during construction, which would involve using a flagger. After discussing the options, it was 
determined that the railroad companies involved would be willing to, and in fact had previously 
discussed, permanently rerouting the rail traffic. This allowed them to eliminate a difficult to 
maintain diamond crossing, and four at-grade crossings, and improve the safety and efficiency of 
rail operations (Prange 2013). The removal of the at-grade crossings also reduced traffic 
congestion in the city. The elimination of this single interaction between the bridge and the rail 
line (denoted by “A” in Figure 26) allowed several other changes to take place in the project. These 
changes included, a redesigned bridge span of a 370-foot tied arch main span (rather than a 300 
foot in the original design) with shorter approach plate girder spans, elimination of a retaining 
wall (denoted by “B” in Figure 26), a lower bridge profile, and others discussed below. The result 
was a savings of $815,000 (Prange 2013). The recreational opportunities afforded by the removal 
of the rail line were the most significant. Now walking and biking trails could be added to the 
project, an existing rail bridge up stream of the project (denoted by “C” in Figure 26) could be 
repurposed into a pedestrian bridge, and greenspace with river front views and access could be 
added - all of which furthered the objectives of the project. 
The removal of the rail line also allowed the bridge piers to be removed from the river. The initial 
design required the bridge piers to be located in the river due to the interference from the rail 
line under the east end of the bridge. There were concerns about construction method cost and 
long-term scour due to the river current. In addition, the removal of the piers had positive 
environmental impacts as the river contained several threatened species (Prange 2013). 
The proposal for reuse of concrete from the bridge demolition was an attempt to both reduce 
environmental impacts and cut costs. Concrete from demolition would be used to build up the 
riverbank (north of the bridge area), which was to serve as a public recreational use resource, thus 
adding to the social vitality of the area. Reusing the old concrete would reduce the amount of fill 
that would be needed to be brought in from off-site. The city was already planning on the 
demolition of other buildings near the west approach to the bridge, and it was proposed that 
recycling the demolition materials from both the bridge and these other structures would save 
costs. This proposal saved $220,000 (Prange 2013). 
The roundabout project proposal was on a section of land east of the bridge approach. The land 
contained obsolete public housing units that the city was planning to remove as part of an urban 
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renewal campaign (Prange 2013). This proposal was considered out of scope (and out of the 
construction limits), but the boundaries of consideration were expanded to include this area as 
doing so would improve traffic flow and reduce accidents - both of which were project objectives. 
It would also reduce costs compared to constructing and maintaining a standard signalized 
intersection, reduce noise and pollution (from idling vehicles at a signal), and be more aesthetic 
(Prange 2013). 
4.1.1.2 Interactions of the Project 
The project contains 5 bridge interactions defined by how the asset to be replaced was interacting 
directly with its immediate surroundings. They were as follows (see Figure 27: Interactions from 
the perspective of the bridge.): 
1. Bridge-River 
2. Bridge-Rail line 
3. Bridge-Recreation use space 
4. Bridge-Environment 
5. Bridge-Corridor enhancement (Seminary Road) 
 
Figure 27: Interactions from the perspective of the bridge. 
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The bridge interacted with the Illinois Railroad, which passed under the east approach. One of the 
significant costs of the construction plan was the cost of maintaining rail operations while the 
existing bridge was removed, and the new bridge constructed above the rail line (Prange 2013). 
Another interaction was between the bridge and the corridor enhancement - which was directly 
impacted by the Seminary Road intersection to the east. This interaction impacted traffic flow and 
volumes. There were two interactions between the bridge and the environment, waste from 
demolition and new bridge piers in the river. Concrete from the demolition was to be removed 
from the site and disposed. The bridge piers were going to be placed in the river, impacting the 
river flow, environment, and the river would also impact the piers and complicate construction.  
4.1.1.3 The Driving Interaction and Disequilibrium 
Due to the river velocity, the potential for scour, and the cost of construction, the preferred design 
was to remove the piers from the water and place them on each shore (Prange 2013). However, 
due to the proximity of the rail line to the river, there was not sufficient space for both the pier 
and the railroad. The rail line would also create a safety issue during construction and be 
expensive. During a Value Engineering study, a discussion on how to reduce the cost of rail traffic 
flagging during construction lead to the determination that the railroad line could be removed 
entirely. This allowed the piers to be located out of the river, and the track removal allowed the 
abandoned rail grade to be put to recreational uses. The creation of recreational opportunities 
was a major objective of the project. The track reconfiguration also allowed the removal of a 
railroad diamond further along the track and several other at-grade crossings. 
4.1.1.4 Complexity Analysis 
The perspective, or area of interest (the symmetry), is important to the analysis. This analysis is 
bridge centric as the bridge is the main component of the project, meaning each primary 
interaction is directly interacting with the bridge. However, it could be community revitalization 
centric, for example, and would have a different number of interactions.  
Prior to the removal of the rail line, there were 5 bridge interactions, with 5 secondary or chained 
interactions. Secondary interactions are defined as interactions that are not directly connected to 
the bridge but can still have a secondary impact through (Figure 28). For example, the bridge 
interacts with the river through the bridge piers, and the river causes scour on the piers. This 
means there are 5 degrees of freedom or states of the system (see Table 2). This research has 
defined the number of interactions from a perspective as the metric of system complexity, 




Figure 28: Interactions without the rail line. The solid lines are primary interactions, and the 
dashed line indicates a secondary interaction. 
Table 2: Complexity 




Original Plan 10 5 5 
After rail line 
removed (Value 
Engineered plan) 
4 3 3 
Removing the rail line from the project reduces the number of project interactions to 4, with 3 of 
those directly impacting the bridge. This means there are 4 total interactions and a complexity of 
3 for the system. As there are fewer states in which the system can exist, the complexity of the 
project is reduced.  
4.1.1.5 Summary 
By reducing the bridge interactions of the project from 5 in the original plan to 3 in the Value 
Engineered plan, the complexity of the project was reduced. Critically, this reduction in 
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interactions does not reduce the primary objectives of the project - quite the opposite, reducing 
the interaction of the bridge and the rail line increased opportunities to better align the plan with 
the project objectives (the symmetry). The correlation to the Crutchfield and Young (1989) 
definition of complexity, is that project becomes more reducible with limited “information loss” 
when better aligned with the project objectives. This illustrates the importance of identifying the 
driving interactions of a project determining the disequilibrium in that interaction, the level of 
complexity, and how to reduce critical interactions to reduce the system complexity.   
4.2 Emergency Management 
This section discusses complexity through the lens of emergency response (a special case of 
project management). This section begins with a background in emergency response concepts 
and operations.  
4.2.1 General Case: 
The concepts of complexity are examined through the lens of emergency response. Using the 
definition from Crutchfield and Young (1989), we can define the symmetry as a “normal 
condition” (no emergency). Or it can be defined as the “normal” or “planned” incident response. 
The difference between the actual condition and the symmetry is the disequilibrium. The 
disequilibrium is detected in a system through dynamic feedback. This can be thought of as the 
system trying to correct itself (return to the mean). However, when the feedback is sufficient, the 
feedback can bring about a phase transition in the system causing the system to settle at a new 
equilibrium (if the system is stable). During an emergency response, the Incident Action Plan (IAP) 
is an outline of the “normal” response (the symmetry). However, as the event progresses, 
deviations from the “normal” response (due to differing initial conditions, resource availability, 
etc.) are the disequilibrium. The Incident Commander makes adjustments based on this 
disequilibrium using the dynamic feedback (the information flow coming back from the 
responders on the ground). However, if the disequilibrium is sufficiently large, a drastic change in 
the response plan (IAP) may be necessary (Bigley and Roberts 2001). This can take the shape of a 
change in mission objectives or may require a change in tactics. Miller (1956) and Flood (1987) 
above discussed information volumes. When overloaded, responders began to chunk 
information, packing it into larger pieces but sacrificing detail. This loss of information is the result 
of the disequilibrium in the system.  
This research has discussed complexity through as the number and nature of interactions. This 
dissertation will now discuss this scaling through the lens of emergency response to determine 
the impact information flow.  
4.2.1.1 ICS Structure and Scaling 
ICS has a hierarchical structure based on functions performed during the incident response. The 
structure uses an Incident Commander (or a group consisting of a commander from each 
responding agency or level of government which form a “Unified Command”) as the manager of 
the response (Bigley and Roberts 2001). This dissertation will use Incident Commander and 
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Unified Command interchangeably as they perform the same functions (however, a Unified 
Command does have the potential for disequilibrium between its members). Under the Incident 
Commander, there are four “General Staff” positions (Operations, Logistics, Planning, 
Finance/Administration), each led by a Section Chief (see Figure 29) (Bigley and Roberts 2001; 
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service (TEEX) 2016). This is very different from how some 
agencies respond in a routine emergency where they are normally organized as a standalone 
organization that must deal with all of the General Staff functions themselves. In ICS, the decision 
makers at the top of the structure (Incident Commander) formulate the objectives and policies of 
the incident response while the responders assigned under the General Staff positions implement 
the tactics devised at the General Staff level (Anderson et al. 2004).  The structure has been 
examined by Moynihan (2009), who concluded that ICS is a “mode of network governance, akin 
to a network administrative organization (NAO)” where an external centralized coordinator is 
charged with organizing the response of multiple independent organizations.  
 
Figure 29: Generic Incident Command Structure 
As mentioned previously, the Incident Command System structure is scalable. This is 
accomplished by only assigning General Staff positions when that section’s activities become too 
burdensome for the Incident Commander to manage alone (Bigley and Roberts 2001). Two 
examples are used to illustrate scaling: first, a traffic stop with one police officer. Second, a multi-
vehicle crash involving three police officers, a fire department, and medical first responders.  
In the first example, a single car is pulled over for speeding. The police officer serves as the 
Incident Commander as well as all of the General Staff positions (Figure 30). The officer 
determines the objectives of the stop, as the Incident Commander, based on a “typical” behavior 
for someone pulled over at a traffic stop. This mental model or Incident Action Plan is the 
symmetry of the system. The methods and tactics to accomplish the objectives are determined, 
as the Operations Section Chief. The officer gathers information and develops the Incident Action 
Plan, as the Planning Section Chief. As the Logistics Section Chief, the officer determines the 
communications needs and what equipment will be needed for the stop. And the officer 
documents the resources used, and the time required for the stop as the Finance/Administration 
Section Chief. As the stop progresses, the officer may learn new information (after running the 
vehicle license plate and learning the vehicle is not registered for example). Based on this new 
information (dynamic feedback), the “typical” stop may now be in disequilibrium. The officer 
Incident Commander or 
Unified Command
Operations Section Planning Section Logistics Section Finance/Administration Section
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makes adjustments (perhaps asking for additional information from the driver) and reassesses the 
situation to see if those adjustments reduces the disequilibrium. 
 
Figure 30: Example ICS structure for a single traffic stop incident 
In the second example, four cars are involved in an accident on slippery roads. Three police 
officers are dispatched as well as a fire department and medical first responders.  
The Fire Chief is the Incident Commander on the scene (Figure 31). The initial reported conditions 
(from the 911 call) will be the basis of the mental model of the incident that the responders will 
have- their symmetry. After arriving on scene, the first step is a scene size-up to determine what 
the objectives are (broadly, these are life safety, property preservation, environmental 
protection). The initial mental model is adjusted based on this information (dynamic feedback). 
The difference between the initial mental model and the new model is the disequilibrium. They 
assign Police Officer 1 as the Planning Section Chief to document the accident and conduct 
interviews (gather information). The tactical operations of law enforcement, fire, and medical 
services will be overseen by the Operations Section Chief, but because the role is unassigned, it 
falls to the Incident Commander to fulfill the role of Operations Section Chief. The Operations 
Section Chief (the Incident Commander in this example) then assigns a “Traffic Control Team” 
consisting of one police officer with two fire fighters to manage traffic control.  Then, medical first 
responders are assigned to see to the medical needs of the occupants of the vehicles involved in 
the crash, and a firefighting team is assigned to perform victim extrication from the vehicles and 
fire protection duties. The Incident Commander then asks the dispatcher (at the 911 Center) to 
document the resources used and the time each unit arrived and departed the scene, making the 
Dispatcher the Finance/Administration Section Chief. As the Logistics Section Chief is not assigned 
(in addition to the Operations Section Chief), the Incident Commander performs the duties of 
those section chiefs. With the assignments made to meet the objectives of the incident, the 
system enters a new equilibrium, and the disequilibrium drops to near zero. However, the 
situation is dynamic. Perhaps the condition of one of the victims changes. This is a change in 
disequilibrium. There is some information loss as the Incident Commander may not be the first 
informed (the medical responders will attend to the victim first and inform the IC when the 
situation is stabilized). This short time interval has both disequilibrium (a change in the situation 
from the plan), and information loss because it takes time to inform the IC that there is a change. 
There is also dynamic feedback to this new information (the responders treat the victim 
differently). If the initial responders arrive on scene and determine that there is a hazardous 
materials spill, the large disequilibrium creates a phase transition. The system begins to work 
towards a new equilibrium. In this case, the information loss occurs prior to the disequilibrium. 
The example illustrates how the Incident Command System can expand or contract to meet the 
needs of the incident and how the characteristics of complexity are present in emergency 
Incident Commander
(Operations, Logistics, Planning, 
Finance/Administration)
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response. The need to make decisions based on incomplete information is a frequent feature of 
emergency response (Yu and Lai 2011). 
 
Figure 31: Example ICS structure for a multi-vehicle traffic accident 
Returning to the question of minimum disequilibrium: Can the disequilibrium ever reduce to zero? 
With different agencies and multiple responders, there is always some information loss between 
them, and this information loss represents disequilibrium. The dynamic feedback to this constant 
background disequilibrium is indicated by comments about preferences in communication: “Can 
you give me an update every 15 minutes?” “Please change to talkgroup 31EMER for all traffic so 
I can hear what’s going on.” Contributions of disequilibrium include a number of issues of 
emergency response identified by Oomes and Neef (2005) and Comfort et al. (2004): 1) time-
criticality: does the incident management scale fast enough to manage the responders and 
resources arriving at the incident; 2) multidisciplinary nature of responders, and if they can 
communicate and work in teams; 3) multiple layers of the response leading to the question 
“Who’s in command?”; and 4) how to maintain situational awareness. The Incident Command 
System works well in addressing three of these concerns. First, the issue of time-criticality of 
response scale-up is addressed by the Incident Commander’s ability to appoint General Staff 
positions as needed, allowing the incident management to scale-up quickly. Second, the 
multidisciplinary nature of (many) responses is addressed by two components of ICS: Unified 
Command, and common operating framework. Having a Unified Command allows a 
representative of the lead responding agencies to have buy-in with the response objectives and 
















people. Having a common framework for the response (ICS) that is mandated across the United 
States by FEMA allows all responding agencies to know what to expect before they arrive on scene 
(reducing disequilibrium). Third, the issue of “Who is in command?” is addressed by specifying 
that the command will be kept at the lowest possible level of government (usually the county or 
city) for an incident. When additional assistance is needed from higher levels of government (state 
or federal), this assistance is requested in the form of resource requests (materials, responders, 
incident management teams, etc.). The question of situational awareness is about information 
flow, and not well addressed in ICS but is a critical in terms of disequilibrium. 
4.2.1.2 Information Flow 
While the scaling flexibility of the Incident Command System is well documented, the scaling of 
the information flow within the ICS is not (Bigley and Roberts 2001, Oomes and Neef 2005). As 
emergencies present in different sizes, the information flow for the incident must scale. As an 
incident grows, the first obstacle is scaling from the Incident Commander, who is also the acting 
Section Chief for all four sections, to having four Section Chiefs the Incident Commander must 
now communicate with via feedback loops (giving instructions and receiving information from 
field units). The success of the response is dependent on the ability for information flow to scale 
with the ICS structure in an appropriate amount of time (Oomes and Neef 2005). In the above 
example of a simple traffic stop, most of the information flow is internal to the officer. However, 
the officer may request information from outside such as requesting a check on the driver’s 
history from a dispatcher (Figure 32). The delay in the system comes from waiting for this 
information to be returned before the officer can refine the Incident Action Plan (i.e., what they 
are going to do). In the multi-vehicle accident example, as the ICS has scaled up, the information 
flow has grown more complicated, and as a result, the number of delays in the information flow 
path has increased (Figure 33). 
 
Figure 32: Information flow for a single traffic stop incident. The delay introduced is the 
Information Request/ information Delivery feedback loop. 
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Many of the incident management problems, identified by Moynihan (2009) and discussed above, 
are fundamentally information flow problems - responders not knowing where they fit into the 
response structure, differing or unclear mission objectives or tasks, difficulty determining who is 
part of the formal response structure and who is not (especially with volunteer organizations), 
and responders not knowing the capabilities of other responder agencies (Moynihan 2009). 
Delays in the information flow can exacerbate these problems. Comfort et al. (2011) states the 
makeup and diversity of the components impact the information flow, as specific needs and 
abilities for information flow may vary, further adding to the disequilibrium.  
 
 
Figure 33: Information flow for multi-vehicle traffic accident 
Work by Comfort et al. (2004) examined information quantity, quality, and flow, noting that a lack 
of important information at critical moments can significantly impact the response. Comfort et al. 
(2004) found that as more useful information was available and communicated to responding 
agencies, the efficiency of the response improved. The initial report of the incident can be 
incomplete or inaccurate, causing the first responders to arrive on scene unprepared for the 
existing conditions (large disequilibrium). The information between the first responders and the 
dispatch center may not be clear due to improper communication procedures. Dispatchers may 
confuse agencies with one another or may not communicate with other dispatchers clearly, such 
as information being misinterpreted at the call center. Information from the dispatch center to 
the Incident Commander may not flow or be inaccurate due to the multiple information 
transactions such as those listed above. Additionally, information from one responding agency to 
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another is also a source of failure with agencies not communicating the necessary information in 
a timely manner. In addition to these lapses in human communication flow, there are also 
technological communication issues such as incompatible, unmaintained, or insufficient 
quantities of equipment. Many first responding groups are volunteers and may lack sufficient 
training. Some responding groups choose to not implement ICS. Therefore, working with other 
responders more difficult as there is no common operating framework. Simpson and Hancock 
2009) note in their review of emergency response literature that the common thread in 
emergency management is working in a disorganized environment. Using graph theory to locate 
cut points in the information network, Comfort et al. (2004) identified critical nodes that, if 
removed, could cause information islands in a network, or teams that did not receive or transmit 
the information that was required to perform their tasks or allow decision makers to give further 
instructions. All of these issues contribute to the disequilibrium of the system. 
The path, timing, and quantity, and accuracy of information passed through the ICS structure will 
help dictate the effectiveness of the emergency response. When information is not readily 
available (delay), the disequilibrium increases. A balance point between incoming information to 
decision makers (typically the Incident Commander) and the information passed on as 
assignments to teams in the field, must be found to provide the most effective information flow. 
Too much information coming into decision makers overwhelms them and risks important 
information being missed (Manoj et al. 2007). Insufficient information or information arriving too 
late, prevents appropriate assignments for teams. A lack of information flow between the Incident 
Commander and the Operations Section Chief will add another step in the communication chain, 
adding additional delay to the system and increasing disequilibrium. 
Fundamentally, communication problems in emergency response are information flow problems. 
As mentioned previously, combining the ideas from Crutchfield and Young (1989) and López-Ruiz 
et al. (1995) implies that information loss is an indication of disequilibrium. For example, 
disequilibrium is the difference between the Incident Action Plan (IAP) and the actual conditions 
on the ground. The IAP is a model of the situation and will be informed and adjusted based on the 
dynamic feedback received by the Incident Commander from the responders. 
Next, two emergency response cases will be presented to demonstrate how the measure of 
system complexity can be applied and complexity can be reduced by reducing the number of 
interactions within the response system. 
4.2.2 Case Study: Houghton Search 
The following case study is from a missing person search in Houghton, Michigan in August of 2019. 
It is an example of how the proposed metric of complexity can be applied to reduce system 
complexity. The study discusses the interactions between the components and the disequilibrium 
present in the form of information flow failures. 
4.2.2.1 Background 
An 82-year-old woman with dementia left her home in west Houghton approximately 13:00 on 
Saturday, August 17, 2019. Her family searched the area until approximately 16:00 when they 
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called the Houghton Police Department. The Houghton Police searched the area until 18:20, when 
they contacted Superior Search and Rescue for assistance. Search and Rescue arrived at 18:50 and 
began sending out search teams. The Michigan DNR fire-spotting plane was diverted to the area 
and searched from the air until dark. A private citizen also took his airplane up and searched from 
the air until dark. Searching on the ground in the woods continued until dark. Then searching on 
the roads (and around buildings) continued until 1:00 on August 18, 2019 when the search was 
paused and scheduled to resume at 8:00.  
During the night, a request was made for Civil Air Patrol (CAP) air assets to the Air Force Rescue 
Coordination Center and was approved by the Michigan State Police. CAP was scheduled to begin 
flying at 7:00.  
At 8:00, Superior Search and Rescue resumed the search with assistance from several local fire 
departments, law enforcement agencies, and medical first responders. Additional volunteers 
began arriving and by 11:00 were overwhelming the staging area. At the peak, there were nearly 
160 volunteers.  
At 14:35, a team reported finding the subject. Michigan Tech EMS was dispatched to the scene to 
assess and extract the subject. The woman was about 20 feet uphill of a snowmobile trail (in an 
area that had been searched several times) under a tree root ball. She was conscious and had no 
obvious injuries. She was transported to the hospital. Search teams were recalled and 
demobilized. 
4.2.2.2 Search Operations 
The searching process is based on cycles, different for each components of the search. These are 
described for several components below.  
Incident Commander/Unified Command Team (Figure 34) activity cycle:  
1. Develops the initial Incident Action Plan (based on initial information available) 
2. Holds tactics meeting with the Operations Section Chief 
3. Begins planning next operational period (next steps) with Planning Section Chief 
4. Reviews information coming back from the field (relayed from Operations Section Chief 
or Planning Section Chief).  
5. Updates Incident Action Plan with new information 
6. Repeats steps 2-5. 
54 
 
Figure 34: Incident Commander/Unified Command Operational Cycle 
Operations Section Chief (Figure 35) activity cycle: 
1. Holds tactics meeting with Incident Commander/Unified Command 
2. Develops assignments for teams 
3. Briefs teams on assignments and receives debriefing information from teams 
4. Develops next assignment for teams 
5. Repeats steps 1-5 
 













Search Team (Figure 36) activity cycle: 
1. Briefs from Operations Section Chief to get assignment 
2. Leaves staging on deployment (transportation) 
3. Searches in the field (carrying out assignment) 
4. Returns to staging (transportation) 
5. Repeats steps 1-5 
 
Figure 36: Search team cycle 
Each of these cycles is linked together. In Figure 34 and Figure 35, for example, the Incident 
Commander and the Operations Section Chief are linked through the tactics meeting. The 
Operations Section Chief and the Search Teams are linked through the briefing/debriefing in 
Figure 35 and Figure 36. These linkages are the interactions in the overall system and can be seen 
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Figure 37: Interactions between component cycles 
4.2.2.3 Interactions 
The interactions associated with this search are broken into two parts the initial operational 
period (the first day of the search) and the second operational period (second day of the search). 
As mentioned previously, the structure of an emergency response is fluid and scales up and down 
as needed. Therefore the interactions scale and reorganize as the incident progresses.  
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Initial Operational period (based on Figure 38):  
• Incident Commander with:  
o Operations Section Chief 
o Law Enforcement 
• Operations Section Chief with: 
o Search teams 1 and 2 
• Law Enforcement with: 
o Officers 1 and 2 
o K9 Unit 
o Dispatch Center 
Second Operational Period (based on Figure 39): 
• Incident Commander with:  
o Operations Section Chief 
o Planning Section Chief 
o Logistics Section Chief 
o Law Enforcement 
o Emergency Medical Services (EMS) 
• Operations Section Chief with: 
o Search teams 1-10 
o Staging Manager 
o Medical First Responders 
o Civil Air Patrol 
• Law Enforcement with: 
o Officers 1, 2, 3 
o K9 Unit 
o Dispatch Center 
• Planning Section Chief with: 
o Documentation group 
o Staging Manager 
o Operations Section Chief 
• Logistics Section Chief with: 
o Transportation providers 
o Food providers 
o Communication support team 
4.2.2.4 Areas of Disequilibrium 
Disequilibrium was present in the search on a number of levels: 
• Information flow: The following information flow issues occurred during the incident: 
o Sometimes information was not relayed to or from the Incident Commander due 
to the Incident Commander being occupied with other tasks 
o The number of teams during the second operation period became unmanageable 
for the Operations Section Chief to debrief and process all of the information fast 
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enough to update assignments efficiently. The result of this was a delay where 
teams were waiting for their next assignment. 
o Due to many of the searchers being volunteers from the community with no 
previous searching or emergency response experience, there was a significant 
gap (disequilibrium) in their knowledge of search operations, safety protocols, 
and expectations. Field training was provided, but further slowed the planning 
and assignment process. 
• Information from subject’s family: Information about the subject was relayed to the 
Incident Commander through law enforcement. This information was verbal and 
incomplete. For example, the subjects last name was misunderstood (and relayed to 
searchers as the wrong name, which the was not corrected for the Incident Commander 
until the second operation period.  
• Weather: The weather was a contributing factor to information flow failures. There was 
heavy rain and wind during most of the second operational period. This limited the 
effectiveness of air support from Civil Air Patrol, made team briefings and debriefings 
difficult to hear, and significantly impacted the information transfer of assignments and 
team debriefing information all of which is done on paper and using paper maps. 
• Search cycle: Due to the large numbers of search teams involved in the response during 
the second operational period, the search cycles outlined above in Figure 35 and Figure 
36 had to occur more quickly than they would normally occur in order to minimize the 
waiting (and likelihood of angry confrontations) of volunteers. 
 
















4.2.2.5 Measurement of Complexity  
The organizational structure of the response is shown in Figure 38 and Figure 39. As discussed in 
the Incident Command System structure above, the structure of the response changed as the 




Figure 39: Second operational period organizational chart. 
As discussed above, the simplified cycle diagram in Figure 40 shows how the search information 
flow moves through the operation. Information flow is two-way and occurs at predetermined 
intervals. The Incident Commander develops the incident objectives and passes this information 

























objectives back to the Incident Commander. There is only one Incident Commander and one 
Operations Section Chief. 
Next, the Operations Section Chief develops the tactics to accomplish the incident objectives and 
assigns search teams to carry out those tactics. The search teams then debrief with the Operations 
Section chief upon completing their assignments. For a search there could be multiple search 
teams that interact with the Operations Section Chief. 
Each Search Team is composed of members. Each member has specific tasks assigned to them to 
complete as part of the search. These can include navigation, radio operation, etc. In a typical 
search, each team is composed of 4-7 people. Although for this search, teams varied in size from 
3 to 15 people at various points during the incident. 
 
Figure 40: Information flow cycle diagram for a search. 
Converting the cycle diagram to a circular diagram shows the interactions at each level of the 
organization. Figure 41 shows how the interactions occur as the incident progresses. The circles 
rotate inside each other as time moves forward. Each dot represents an interaction between a 
circle and the circle that encloses it.  
Next, the waveforms of this search are calculated. For the relationship between the Operation 
Section Chief and the search teams, because the number of teams was constantly changing for 
this analysis 9 teams will be used. However, there will be a delay added representing the delay 
resulting from overcrowding the Operations Section Chief with too many teams. The result is a 
circular representation shown in Figure 42 rather than Figure 41. Each team will also be shown 
with 4 people. 
Therefore, the parameters are: 
n0=1, Incident Commander 
n1=1, Operations Section Chief 
n2=9 (teams per Operations Section Chief) 
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n3=4 members per team 




Figure 41: Circular representation of the search operations for a balanced system, showing the 




Figure 42: Unbalanced search circular representation of the search system. 
The waveforms of each component are shown in  
Figure 43. The frequencies and delay are shown in each plot. The Incident Commander and 
Operations Section Chief have the same waveforms, indicating that interaction is in balance. 
However, the Search Team waveform has a delay every cycle (while the team waits for their 
briefing or debriefing) indicating this is an unbalanced interaction.  
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Figure 43: Component waveforms from Houghton Search. 
The results (Figure 44) show that the three waveform frequencies are present in the FFT of the 
summation of the four components. However, as the Incident Commander and the Operations 
Section Chief both have the same frequency, the magnitude of that frequency (1 CPT) is twice 
that of the other frequencies present, indicating there are two components at that frequency.  
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Figure 44: Summation of the four SAR component waveforms and the FFT of the sum, showing 
the magnitude and phase angle. 
4.2.2.6 Driving Interaction 
The driving interaction, or limiting interaction, for this incident was the interaction between the 
Operations Section Chief and the search teams. Due to the volume of volunteers, many of whom 
had no search or emergency response experience, there was disequilibrium in the form of delay 
in assignment creation and information loss due to abbreviated briefings and debriefings which 
contributed to the complexity of the system. The Incident Command General Staff noted the 
number of volunteers was increasing rapidly, assigned a Deputy Operation’s Chief and added 
responsibilities to the Staging Manager (Figure 45). These additional people assisted with 
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organizing, training, and briefing volunteers which reduced the number of interactions seen by 
the Operations Section Chief (Table 3). 
 
Figure 45: Second operational period (after additional staff added) organizational chart. 
Table 3: Complexity by operational period 






1 (initial) 8 2 2 
2 24 15 15 
2 (after additional 
staff) 
25 7 7 
4.2.2.7 Summary 
While ultimately successful, the disequilibrium present in several aspects of the Houghton Search 
impacted the efficiency of the response. While steps were taken during the incident to reduce the 
disequilibrium, the result was the total number of system interactions increased due to adding 
additional positions for the purpose of reducing delays in search team briefings and debriefings. 




























This case study reinforces the concept that using the number of interactions as a measure of 
complexity is really the potential for disequilibrium failures, but it is not a given that an increase 
in complexity will increase the disequilibrium in a system. This case continues to reinforce the 
importance of identifying the driving interaction and the disequilibrium in that interaction.  
4.2.3 Case Study: 2018 Western Upper Peninsula Flooding 
The largest case study of this dissertation is from the 2018 flash flooding in Houghton County, 
Michigan. The value of this case study is that it is a larger response than the previous case of the 
Houghton Search, both in terms of responders and the geographic area. It also involved 
components from outside the area at both the state and federal level with all of the coordination 
required to adhere to the protocols of the state and federal government. 
4.2.3.1 Background 
On June 17, 2018, central Houghton County endured a significant rain event that dropped 
approximately 6.7 inches of rain in a 6-8 hour period (Figure 46), classified by the National 
Weather Service as a 750 to 1000 year rain event. The result was catastrophic flash flooding 
beginning at 4:35AM over the highest populated portions of the county causing large scale 
infrastructure and personal property damage in excess of $120 million.  
 
Figure 46: 6-hour Precipitation total: 1AM-7AM, June 17, 2018. Source: NOAA 
Local resources were almost immediately overwhelmed. Additional assistance was requested 
from the State of Michigan through a request for a State Disaster Declaration, which was granted. 
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The State Disaster Declaration opened up the availability for state resources to assist with the 
local effort. All of the state resources were organized through the State Emergency Operations 
Center (located 500 miles away). While additional resources were critical to the response, those 
resources also came with a nearly doubling of the number of people (components) that were now 
interacting with the response system. This significantly strained the information flow in the 
response at the Incident Command level.  
While significant damage was done to the road system in the county, there was also significant 
but localized damage to homes. Approximately 468 homes were impacted with three destroyed 
and 50 with major damage. FEMA estimated the individual damage estimate to be $2,908,095 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency 2018b).  Cleanup and repairs were organized through 
a Volunteer Resource Center (VRC) where homeowners could call and request volunteers to help 
clean out homes or yards. More than 2,131 volunteers (about 6% of the county population) 
helped with hundreds of projects including: digging mud out of basements, moving rocks out of 
front yards, debris removal, and transportation of equipment. While a Presidential Disaster 
Declaration was received for the Public Assistance (DR-4381-MI), a federal declaration for 
Individual Assistance was not approved, leaving homeowners without financial assistance from 
the FEMA. 
The response can be divided into four stages: initial, stabilization, repair, and recovery. With each 
stage having a different organizational structure and its own set of interactions. This dissertation 
will examine primarily the initial and stabilization phases of the incident as they involved the most 
interactions and information flow issues. 
The structure of the initial response (Figure 47) involved almost exclusively local entities. 
Following a modified ICS structure, the Unified Command consisted of the Houghton County 
Emergency Management Coordinator and the Houghton County Sheriff. The structure essentially 
had each entity report directly to the Unified Commanders (while the County does employ the 
FEMA ICS structure, there were very few people present that were familiar with the ICS structure 
at the time of the initial phase). This very quickly overwhelmed the Unified Command’s capacity 
to receive, process, and transmit information without having the agencies wait. As the incident 
was still unfolding, decisions about evacuations, public warning, and rescue priorities were 
needed. This had a significant impact on the response.  
As the incident moved from the initial into the stabilization phase (after the first 12-16 hours), the 
Unified Command added an incident management specialist from the Michigan Department of 
Energy, Great Lakes, and Environment (EGLE) to assist with the response. Additionally, recognizing 
the structure was unmanageable, a more formal ICS structure was setup (Figure 48). Section 
Chiefs were selected to serve as contact points in order to group agencies together. This reduced 
the critical interactions the Unified Commanders were required to maintain and the delay 
agencies were experiencing under the initial response structure. 
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Figure 47: Initial Phase Organizational Structure 
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The stabilization phase response structure was organized at the county level with each 
jurisdiction, responding agency, and infrastructure company taking part in twice daily update 
meetings. These meetings covered: 
Morning Briefing  
• Status changes overnight 
• Objectives for the day 
• Requests for resources 
• Questions for other agencies 
• Time for one-on-one coordination with other agencies 
• Public Information messages to release 
Afternoon Planning Meeting 
• Review of accomplishments from the day 
• Discussion on plans for overnight 
• Discussion of issues of concern that came up during the day 
• Changes in resource status 
Despite the significant damage to road infrastructure, damage to other infrastructure systems 
was light. Few power outages were reported in populated areas, some residents lost natural gas 
service when their road washed out, but again, these outages were very localized. There were no 
communication outages and cell phone towers were not overwhelmed. The public safety radio 
system (Michigan Public Safety Communication System (MPSCS)) was heavily loaded in the early 
hours of the response but not beyond the first 5-8 hours and the system remained usable. 
4.2.3.2 Interactions 
The interactions in the 2018 flood response are listed below for both the initial response phase 
and the stabilization phase of the incident.  
4.2.3.2.1 Initial Phase Interactions: 
Unified Command with: 
• State of Michigan - Emergency Management and Homeland Security Division of the 
Michigan State Police (EMHSD) 
• Michigan Technological University 
• Houghton County Road Commission 
• Local hospitals (2) 
• Long-term Care facilities (3 involved) 
• Mercy EMS (ambulance service) 
• Negaunee Regional Communications Center 
• Michigan Department of Transportation 
• Fire Service (via one liaison) 
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• Law Enforcement (via Houghton County Sheriff and Michigan State Police Post 
Commander) 
• Houghton County Building Inspector 
• Houghton County Drain Commissioner 
• Houghton County Mine Inspector 
• Houghton County Board of Commissioners Chairman (Chief Elected Official) 
Law Enforcement Liaison (Houghton County Sheriff) with: 
• Keweenaw County Sheriff’s Office 
• Michigan State Police 
• Houghton City Police 
• Hancock City Police 
• Michigan Tech Public Safety and Police Services 
Fire Service Liaison (Bootjack Fire Chief) with: 
• Stanton Township Fire and First Responders 
• Houghton City Fire 
• Hancock City Fire 
• Ripley Fire 
• Quincy-Franklin-Hancock Township Fire 
• Hubbell Fire 
• Tamarack City Fire 
• Chassell Township Fire 
• Hurontown Fire and Rescue 
• Lake Linden Fire 
• Laurium Village Fire 
4.2.3.2.2 Stabilization Phase Interactions: 
Unified Command with: 
• State of Michigan - Emergency Management and Homeland Security Division of the 
Michigan State Police (EMHSD) 
• Michigan Technological University 
• Michigan Department of Natural Resources 
• Volunteer Resource Center 
• Operations Section Chief 
• Logistics Section Chief 
• Public Health Officer 
• Negaunee Regional Communications Center 
• Local non-profit foundations 
• Houghton County Board of Commissioners Chairman (Chief Elected Official) 
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EMHSD District Coordinator with: 
• State Emergency Operations Center 
• FEMA 
• Stage Damage Assessment Support Team 
Public Information Officer with: 
• Local media (radio, print, TV) 
• State and Federal Elected Officials 
Operations Section Chief with: 
• Houghton County Road Commission 
• Michigan Department of Transportation 
• National Guard 
• City of Houghton Public Works 
• City of Hancock Public Works 
• Mercy EMS (ambulance service) 
• Fire Service (via one liaison) 
• Law Enforcement (via Houghton County Sheriff and Michigan State Police Post 
Commander) 
• Upper Peninsula Power Company 
• SEMCO Energy (natural gas supplier) 
• Michigan Department of Energy, Great Lakes and Environment (EGLE) Team Stream 
assessment team who coordinated with: 
o Houghton County Drain Commissioner 
o Houghton County Mine Inspector 
Logistics Section Chief with: 
• Debris management agencies (Waste Management, Houghton County, State of Michigan 
Department of Corrections)  
• Damage Assessment Group leader 
• Donations Management Group Leader 
Public Health Chief with: 
• Western UP Health Department (environmental health) 
• Houghton County Building Inspector 
Houghton County Board of Commissioners Chairman (Chief Elected Official) with: 
• Township, village, city officials 
Law Enforcement Liaison (Houghton County Sheriff) with: 
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• Keweenaw County Sheriff’s Office 
• Michigan State Police 
• Houghton City Police 
• Hancock City Police 
• Michigan Tech Public Safety and Police Services 
Fire Service Liaison (Bootjack Fire Chief) with: 
• Stanton Township Fire and First Responders 
• Houghton City Fire 
• Hancock City Fire 
• Ripley Fire 
• Quincy-Franklin-Hancock Township Fire 
• Hubbell Fire 
• Tamarack City Fire 
• Chassell Township Fire 
• Hurontown Fire and Rescue 
• Lake Linden Fire 
• Laurium Village Fire 
4.2.3.3 Areas of Disequilibrium 
Disequilibrium was present in the 2018 flood in many places. Disequilibrium is the difference 
between the expected or normal value and the actual value. In this flooding incident, the incident 
itself was a disequilibrium for the normal or expected. While flash flooding and urban flooding 
was present in the Houghton County Hazard Mitigation Plan (Western Upper Peninsula Planning 
and Development Region 2020), significant infrastructure damage due to flooding was not and no 
recent exercises had been conducted with significant road outages.  
Information flow disequilibrium: 
• Phone and text reports: During the initial phase of the response, too many agencies were 
reporting to the Unified Commanders. At the emergency operations center, phone and 
text messages were overloading the phones. The Emergency Management Coordinator 
and the Sheriff were on two phones at a time with several calls holding while additional 
calls were coming in. This continued for the first 4 hours of the incident (approximately 
4:30 AM-8:30 AM). The result of this backlog was that agencies that needed decisions to 
be made were unable to get answers in a timely manner and had to act on their own. It 
also reduced the situational awareness of the Unified Commanders and they did not have 
sufficient time to share the information from calls they had received with each other. 
• Evacuation: In particular, a decision about evacuating a long-term care facility of residents 
was needed. A concern about a potential earthen dam breaching and causing a mudslide 
in the community of Hubbell resulted in a discussion between the Emergency 
Management Coordinator, the Hubbell Fire Chief, Mercy EMS President, and the long-
term care facility manager about evacuating the residents of the facility. The overload of 
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information and the lack of ability to make calls out of the Emergency Operation Center 
(due to the significant number in incoming calls) could have significantly impacted this 
critical operation.  
• Damage reports: Receiving damage reports (road outages in particular) was critical to the 
response. Road outages not only impede the general public but impact the ability to get 
emergency vehicles to areas in need. During the initial stages of the flood, several 
communities were completely cutoff from outside support due to road outages. Reports 
of outages were made to the Emergency Operations Center and a list was compiled. But 
with no GIS support available and Houghton County’s reliance on a free version Google 
Suite with limited map sharing options, setting up a common shared map that could be 
easily relayed to agencies and the public took more than 8 hours. During the remainder 
of the initial and stabilization phases of the incident, only a list of road closures was 
actively maintained with the locations looked up on an online map as needed.  
• Local Amateur Radio Emergency Service (ARES): According to the Emergency Operation 
Plan, during an emergency, local amateur radio operators can be called to assist with 
information gathering. Local Amateur Radio Emergency Service (ARES) members were 
asked to setup a radio communications network (net) to take damage reports from their 
members scattered around the county. This net was maintained for the first 14 hours of 
the incident but only received 4 reports.  
• Damage assessment: FEMA requires a preliminary damage assessment within 72 hours of 
the incident stabilizing. For this task, fire fighters, search and rescue members and 
emergency management coordinators from other counties volunteered to go door to 
door across the affected areas of the county. By this time, staff from the Emergency 
Management and Homeland Security Division of the Michigan State Police (EMHSD) had 
arrived with a damage assessment system using GIS and iPads. Each team was quickly 
trained and send out on assignments to cover the affected areas taking pictures, rating 
damage (FEMA uses a 1-5 scale) and recording the results. Unfortunately, the first day of 
damage assessment was poorly organized with some areas being missed, other areas 
being covered twice, and additional areas not consistently assessed. Starting the second 
day, a damage assessment group coordinator was chosen (who was also not one of the 
Unified Commanders) and designed the team assignments, reiterated the objective and 
methods to use, and was able to correct the errors of the first day. 
Logistics 
• Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and County Offices: The Houghton County 
Emergency Operation Center was located approximately 15 miles north of the county 
offices. Due to road outages, it was decided to setup an alternative EOC at the 
Sheriff’s Office. According to the county plan, the alternate EOC was located in the 
basement of the courthouse, however, that space was flooded with 8 inches of water 
during the early parts of the incident. Incidentally, that space also included the office 
(including the computer, hard copy Emergency Operation Plans, etc. of the 
Emergency Management Coordinator). The county plans did not account for both the 
primary and alternate EOC’s to be inaccessible in a wide-scale emergency. The result 
was an ad hoc EOC with the equipment the Sheriff’s Office and other responders had 
from home.  
74 
• Donations: there was an outpouring of donations from around the country as news 
of the flood spread including semi-truck loads of paper products from Kimberly Clark, 
power tools from Milwaukee Tool, trash pumps from the Eagle Mine in Marquette, 
barbecue meals from Arkansas, truckloads of bottled water, and many other items. 
The local emergency plan was not setup to accommodate the large volume of 
donations and there was not a significant number of community members requesting 
items. This posed a significant challenge for accepting, inventorying, and then 
distributing these donations. At the end of the incident, donations management was 
the most time-consuming component of the response for the Incident Command 
Team. 
4.2.3.4 Measurement of Complexity 
The measurement of complexity is, as mentioned previously in this dissertation, based on 
perspective. For this analysis, the perspective is from the Unified Command as they were 
organizing the response (Table 4). The circular representation (Figure 49) shows the interactions 
of the Unified Command, agencies, and responders during the initial phase. In the initial phase, 
the overlap in the inner (agency) circles indicates disequilibrium- where the Unified Command 
could not accommodate the agencies fast enough to eliminate delay. In contrast, Figure 50 shows 
that there are only two points of interaction (the scheduled meetings) and all agencies overlay 
each other on the inner circle.  
 
Figure 49: Unified Command-Agency Interactions during the initial phase of the 2018 flood. Note 
the overlap of the inner circles indicates disequilibrium. 
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Figure 50: Unified Command-Agency Interactions during the stabilization phase of the 2018 
flood response. 
Table 4: Complexity by operational period 
4.2.3.5 Driving Interactions 
There was no single driving interaction in this incident, but rather there was a set of interactions 
that when removed, significantly reduced the disequilibrium and increased the efficiency of the 
response. Reducing the number of direct reports to the Unified Command and assigning Section 
Chiefs (specifically Operation, Logistics, and Public Health) removed the backlog of messages and 
allowed the Unified Command to move from a reactionary operation to a planning and proactive 
operational stance. Table 4 shows the complexity of the initial and stabilization phases of the 
incident.  





1 (initial) 42 19 19 
2 (Stabilization) 60 10 10 
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4.2.3.6 Summary 
Recognizing the need to reduce the information flow failures during the initial phase of the 
incident, the Unified Command began creating Section Chiefs to reduce the number of 
interactions the Unified Command needed to have. While the total number of interactions in the 
system actually increased, the interactions with the Unified Command decreased, reducing the 
complexity. This is shown by the smaller disequilibrium by reducing the delay in the information 
flow. The second thing the Unified Command did was to request updates only twice a day. By 
requesting updates only at these times, that effectively consolidated the interactions together 
into two larger (longer) interactions. 
By examining the number and nature of the interactions, the complexity was examined and 
reduced for the Unified Command. Like the previous case, this incident demonstrates that 
measuring complexity by the number of interactions from a given symmetry (perspective). This is 
also a decrease in disequilibrium for the system. The idea of having fewer direct reports is also 
reinforced by FEMA who recommends that a single supervisor oversees no more than 5-7 people 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency 2018c) and is supported by the research of Miller 
(1956), mentioned earlier in this dissertation.   
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5 Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Conclusions 
The objective of this research was to determine a measure of complexity and system 
characteristics that indicate likely points of information flow failure in project management. Using 
methods to visualize the number and nature of component interactions, the disequilibrium can 
be detected, and the critical interactions identified. Identifying these critical interactions allows 
the project manager to reduce the number of interactions for the desired symmetry, decreasing 
the complexity, and the potential for disequilibrium leading to a reduction in information flow 
failures. As demonstrated in the case studies, not all interactions can be reduced without 
information loss. Further, reducing the complexity for a particular perspective or symmetry, may 
increase complexity for other areas of the system.  
The information flow failures that negatively impact the efficiency of a project or response are 
points of disequilibrium that occur at interactions between two components of a system. As the 
number of component intersections increase, the degrees of freedom increase, which increases 
the number of points that can be in disequilibrium. Therefore, by reducing the number of 
interactions (reducing the complexity), the opportunities for disequilibrium are reduced.  
This research also has discussed project scaling and the application of the measure of complexity. 
As project systems scale, the measure of complexity continues to apply. Larger systems, as shown 
in the case studies, have a greater number of components and interactions. But this alone does 
not indicate higher complexity. The complexity is based on the symmetry; therefore, overall 
system interactions may increase, but the interactions given a chosen symmetry may be lower – 
leading to a lower measure of complexity. It is interesting to note that this conclusion of the 
research (limiting the number of interactions to reduce complexity, and therefore information 
flow failures) mirrors the guidance from FEMA regarding span of control, or the maximum number 
of people or groups a supervisor can effectively manage. FEMA’s guidance states supervising more 
than 5 people can lead to communication failures. This dissertation does not specify a maximum 
number of interactions before failure, but this is an area for future work. 
Also of note are the connections between this research and the Kalman minimal realization of 
these systems. Since signals may not be directly observable (recall that projects do not necessarily 
give off signals), the ability to determine if an interaction is in disequilibrium indirectly would be 
helpful. For example, in an emergency that is taking place over a large geographic area, the cycle 
times for search teams in a remote area may not be measurable from the command post. But, 
based on the remote staging area’s manager, and other search teams operating at that location, 
the state of a particular team could be estimated.  
5.2 Limitations 
The research in this dissertation has made some assumptions and has limitations in its application. 
However, these limitations do not change the overarching measure of complexity as a function of 
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the number and nature of interactions for a system. Moreover, the methods used to analyze and 
visualize the disequilibrium in a system may not all apply to all types of systems as effectively.  
First, this research assumes that there is data available such as cycle times of components, the 
organization, or relationship between components of a project or emergency response. It also 
assumes that there is time for processing that data, even at a basic level during the project or 
incident.  
Second, the images in this dissertation, use the assumption that cycle times are constant for all of 
a particular type of component (search team for example). This is not necessarily the case as these 
cycle times may vary. However, that does not change the underlying concept that the circle 
circumference represents the cycle time of the component.  
Third, it is important to recognize that the analysis in the case studies represents snapshots in 
time of those projects. As the projects scale up and down, the system changes and the measure 
of complexity can change as well.  
5.3 Contributions 
This research contributes to the body of knowledge by providing quantitative methods for 
measuring system complexity. The measurement can be used in planning and analyzing projects 
or incidents. Practitioners in project and emergency management can use the knowledge of the 
number and nature of interactions in their systems to reduce the potential for information flow 
failures. Project and emergency managers can build into their plans, a time for reflection on 
project information flow failures and examine what driving interactions are causing that 
disequilibrium. Not all aspects of each project can be measured or planned, but knowledge of the 
concept that fewer interactions reduces the potential for disequilibrium in a system, which 
reduces the opportunities of information flow failures, can help managers improve their projects. 
With information flow failures being nearly universally cited in emergency response and exercise 
After-Action Reports as a cause of inefficiency, this research can help bridge that shortcoming.  
5.4 Recommendations for future work 
There are several areas of related research that were beyond the scope of this project but would 
further the goal of improving efficiency in project management: 
• A discussion of the behavior of agents (components) that is unplanned and emergent
behavior would be beneficial. This research assumed that the components or resources
followed instructions and assignments. However, in real projects, resources may (will)
improvise or simply ignore instructions and assignments if they choose. One question to
address is: If the disequilibrium reaches a critical point, and the agent decides not to wait,
what will that agent do and how does that impact the complexity of the system when
agents create new interactions? This direction would likely be a fruitful collaboration with
research in behavioral science.
• The impact of exercises and training on disequilibrium should be explored. FEMA requires
responders and emergency management coordinators to meet annual exercise and
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training requirements for grant program compliance (the Emergency Management 
Performance Grant for example). Data on how effective this requirement is in reducing 
disequilibrium would be valuable and could inform this often expensive and very time-
consuming requirement in the future. 
• Additional research into the geographic realm of complexity and disequilibrium should be
made. Already the author is conducting research into the differences in lost person
behavior using different methods such as least cost path in comparison to a Bayesian
method. This research would look at the differences in disequilibrium while potentially
holding the number of interactions constant (i.e., same resources available, different
search methods).
• While discussed briefly in this dissertation, examining disequilibrium through the lens of
network stability, resilience, and robustness of complex infrastructure networks, is an
area of research that could be explored further. The relationship between
interdependent infrastructure components and the component interactions could be
similar to the work conducted in this dissertation. Fundamentally, this would try to
answer the question similar to one asked above: How much disequilibrium can a system
handle before it breaks?
These additional areas of future research would continue this work and further develop use cases 
for the metric of complexity developed in this dissertation. 
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A Appendix: Additional Plots of Varying Frequency 
and Delay 
The plots in this appendix continue the experiments described in Chapter 3. The first two plots 
(Figure 51 and Figure 52) show varying frequencies. The third and fourth plots (Figure 53 and 
Figure 54) show the results of varying the delay on the second component (the excavator). The 
frequency of the truck cycle remains constant (at 1CPT) and the frequency of the excavator also 
remains constant at 12CPT. However, the delay (wait time) for the excavator is varied from time= 
0 units to time= 0.1 units. The third set of plots (Figure 55 and Figure 56) show the results of 
varying both frequency and delay.  
Figure 51: Varying the frequency and comparing the summation waveform, FFT magnitude, and 
phase calculations shows that each FFT magnitude plot has the frequency components clearly 
visible as spikes on the normalized magnitude plot. The phase angle of each component is 
plotted as well as comparison to the base case (left side).  
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Figure 52: Continuation of figure 48: Varying the frequency and comparing the summation 
waveform, FFT magnitude, and phase calculations shows that each FFT magnitude plot has the 
frequency components clearly visible as spikes on the normalized magnitude plot.  
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Figure 53: Plots of varying delay while holding the frequencies constant. The plots on the left are 
with no delay (balanced system). The plots on the right are with a delay of ε=0.025. The phase 
angle difference plot on the bottom is the difference in phase angle from the control (plot with  
ε=0) and this iteration (plot with ε=0.025). 
88 
Figure 54: Continuation from figure A-3. Continuing to increase the delay while holding the 
frequencies constant. The plots on the left are with a delay of ε=0.05. The plots on the right are 
with a delay of ε=0.1. The FFT in plot (3,2) shows that the delay in the excavator plot is growing 
large enough that it effectively acts as another frequency in the system. 
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Figure 55: Varying both the frequency and delay and comparing the result to the baseline with 
two frequencies and no delay. 
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Figure 56: Continuation of figure 54. Varying both the frequency and delay and comparing the 
result to the baseline with two frequencies and no delay. 
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B Copyright Documentation 
Figure 43: “6-Hour Precipitation”. Source: National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration. Provided by: National Weather Service, July 2018. 
